RESOLUTION of the blocked build_contract_project node (afterSwap delta settlement). The node is correct, and its proposed mechanism is approved verbatim: a nonzero afterSwap fee delta credited to the hook must be settled inside the same unlock, and bookkeeping alone cannot settle or back it. The design is amended as follows.

In afterSwap: compute the cut, read the beneficiary from the registry, then settle the hook's delta by calling PoolManager.mint(address(this), currency.toId(), cut) so the hook holds an ERC-6909 claim on the PoolManager backing the accrual, and credit crownOwed[beneficiary][currency] += cut.

The precise constraint is: during settlement the hook may call ONLY the PoolManager (mint/settle/take as needed) and the registry staticcall read - never any contract whose target or code is beneficiary-controlled, and never a transfer to the beneficiary. claim() runs in its own unlock: it redeems the hook's ERC-6909 claim for that currency (burn the claim, take the currency) and transfers the caller's full crownOwed balance to the caller, zeroing the balance first.

Everything else from the original launch objective stands unchanged: ThroneRegistry, challenge math and parameters, the accrue-and-pull design, THRONE demo with MIN_REIGN demo instance = 0, the canonical ticker site, and the test matrix including the malicious-contract-beneficiary liveness test and the registry token-address immutability assertion.

The project workspace is empty (the parent blocked before delivering source), so build the full system from scratch with this amendment applied.