Updated only launch.json, preserving all supplied values and the exact notes string.

Schema validation passed; permissions and constructor arguments match the implementation. forge build succeeded with lint warnings; forge test passed all 36 tests.

Review complete. The findings file is written and verified, the scratch test is removed, and no tracked file changed.

Outcome: no critical, high, or medium defect in the assigned area. The permission model of WorkLaunchHook3 is sound: every PoolManager callback is caller-restricted, the one privileged setter is bounded and has a single writer, and every value path out of the hook ends at the hard-coded treasury. The existing 36-test suite against the real v4.0.0 PoolManager passes.

What I reported in .imd-findings.json:

• Low (economics, outside my lenses but substantiated): the 50% snipe-guard fee only exists in afterSwap, and the hook has no liquidity callbacks. I confirmed against the real PoolManager that an IMD-only position placed one tick-spacing below the opening price acquired about 30,515 WORK for about 29,864 IMD with zero hook fee once a seller pushed the price through it. A swapper at the same moment received about 29,450 WORK for 60,000 IMD. Any fix changes the permission flags and the mined address, so I flagged it as a design decision rather than a silent change.
• Info (trust assumption): the treasury key can move the standing fee between 0 and 10% instantly, ahead of a pending trade and mid-ramp, with no timelock or key rotation. Access control is correct and matches the brief.
• Info (trust assumption): beforeInitialize ignores the initializer and the starting price, so atomic deploy-plus-initialize by the factory is what protects the opening price and ramp clock. The README already documents this.

Coverage: all 8 ABI entry points have rows (6 hold, 2 carry the info findings), plus 7 invariant and manifest rows. Exact-in versus exact-out fee symmetry, both sweep legs, claim custody, single-pool enforcement, and launch.json consistency with the constructor and flags 0x2044 all hold.

Not reached: nothing within the assigned guides. The static-analysis leads (strict equality on openedAt, unused unlock return, timestamp use) were traced and are benign, so they are omitted.

The review is complete and the findings file is written.

Result: the fee math in WorkLaunchHook3 holds under the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap checks. One low-severity rounding-direction defect was recorded. No critical, high or medium findings.

What I verified, against the real PoolManager from lib/v4-core:

• The unspecified-currency selection in afterSwap matches the PoolManager's own convention in all four mode and direction combinations, and the hook's positive delta is netted to zero by its claim mint.
• The exact-output gross-up produces the same effective price as exact-input, so the "same share in both modes" claim is true. The fuzzed share deficit never exceeds one unit across rates 0 to 50% and amounts from 1 wei to 1e24.
• No division by zero, no overflow, and no reachable int128 wrap. The int128 cast would need a single-swap delta of 2^127, far above the 1e27 supply.
• The ramp has no underflow, is continuous at the 900-second boundary, and stays within the standing fee and 50% for every admin setting, including mid-ramp changes.
• The Slither strict-equality lead on openedAt == 0 is not a defect. The timestamp is never zero on a live chain.
• Sweep legs are independent and reentrancy-safe. Claims are burned before the take, and the direct balance is read after the unlock.

The one finding (low): every fee division floors in the trader's favour. At the 2% standing fee, an exact-input swap whose raw output is under 50 wei pays no fee at all, and the ramp under-charges by up to one basis point per second. The impact is dust at 18 decimals and does not compound, so it is reported for completeness with a ceiling-division fix suggested.

Coverage: all eight listed entry points have rows, plus three invariant rows. One note outside my area is recorded in the beforeInitialize row: the callback does not check the caller or the initial price, which only matters if the factory ever deploys the hook and initializes the pool in separate transactions.

The scratch test I used was removed, and no project file was changed.

The findings file is in place and is excluded from git by the repository's own exclude rules, which is the expected collection path. No tracked file was changed.

Review result

The hook's control flow is sound for its core paths. I traced the swap fee against the vendored v4-core: the unspecified-currency selection in afterSwap matches the manager's own Hooks.afterSwap branch, the claim mint and the returned delta net to zero for the hook, the exact-out gross-up is algebraically correct, and unlockCallback is reachable only through the hook's own sweep. Reentrancy through token callbacks cannot double-redeem because the manager's claim balance is the source of truth and a nested unlock is caught.

Two defects survived the validation gates, both low:

1. Unrestricted pool initialization at src/WorkLaunchHook3.sol:37. The hook checks the key but not the initializer or the opening price. Once the hook has code, any account can open the one accepted pool at any price, and the snipe ramp starts at that moment. The factory's own initialize then reverts. This is reachable only if the factory does not deploy and initialize in one transaction. A fail-now proof test is attached.
2. Sweep legs are not independent at src/WorkLaunchHook3.sol:82. A reverting balanceOf or short transfer return data on the IMD leg aborts the whole sweep before the WORK leg runs. No funds are lost, only delayed, and only a non-standard IMD contract triggers it.

Coverage records all 8 listed entry points plus 5 invariant rows. Six entry points hold, two carry the findings above. The static-analysis leads were each traced and none became a finding on its own. One open item is recorded in coverage rather than as a finding: I could not verify that the fee tier 12500 is in the launch policy's tier list, since that list was not supplied.

The project's 36 tests, forge build and forge fmt --check still pass. The only failing test is the proof under test/scratch, which is deleted before submission.

The findings file is in place and excluded from git by the repository's own exclude list, the scratch test is gitignored, and no tracked file changed. The review is complete.

Outcome: the economics of the hook hold. The fee share, the ramp, the claim accounting and the sweep all behave as the notes describe, and I found no fund-loss defect. I reported one low finding and two documented trust assumptions, all with reproductions in a scratch test run against the real PoolManager.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json:

• Low, pool opening is permissionless and unpriced. The hook validates pair, fee, spacing and hook address in beforeInitialize but ignores the caller and the initial price. Once the hook contract exists, the first address to call initialize fixes the starting price and starts the 900 s ramp, and openedAt can never be reset. A stranger opening at an extreme price bricks the launch for that salt, and a stranger opening at the correct price early lets seed liquidity arrive after the ramp has already decayed to 2%. Both require a gap between hook deployment and the factory's initialize call, which the service description says is a single transaction, so this is a deployment-ordering dependency rather than a loss path.
• Info, standing fee applies instantly. A trade pays whatever rate is live when it executes. The treasury moving from 2% to 10% ahead of a pending 100 IMD trade cuts the output by about 8%. That is inside the power the brief grants, so it is recorded as a trust assumption, not a defect.
• Info, no alternative exit for stranded claims. If IMD ever permanently refuses transfers to the treasury, IMD fee claims stay inside the PoolManager with no admin or fallback recipient. Not reachable with a plain token, recorded as a dependency assumption on the real IMD contract.

Coverage: all eight listed entry points have rows, plus five invariant and manifest rows. afterSwap, sweep, unlockCallback and the token functions hold. I traced the four swap mode and direction cases through the vendored Hooks and PoolManager code and confirmed the hook's net delta is zero and the fee share is exact in both modes. The Slither leads (strict equality, unused return, timestamp use) were checked and are not defects. Nothing in the assigned guides was left unreached.

Added failure-path, fuzz, and stateful invariant tests against the real PoolManager.

Validation passed: forge build, 47 tests, and 24,576 randomized calls.

Reported one medium-severity sweep-isolation defect with reproduced failing proofs in .imd-findings.json: certain IMD failures block WORK sweeping. Live IMD behavior remains unverified.

The review is complete. The findings file is written and validated, and no source, config or dependency file was changed.

Outcome. No critical, high or medium defect survived reproduction. Six findings are recorded in .imd-findings.json: four low and two info, with all 8 entry points covered plus three invariant rows.

What I kept, after reproducing each against the real PoolManager v4.0.0

• sweep() legs not independent (low). Merged the test writer's medium and the flow specialist's low. The balance read and the transfer return-data decode sit outside the try/catch, so a reverting IMD balanceOf or a one-byte IMD transfer return aborts the WORK leg. The supplied proof fails on this code with the stated message. I lowered it to low because a standard ERC-20 never triggers it, and under either trigger the PoolManager's own sync and take would already fail to settle IMD, so the pool is broken before sweep independence matters.
• beforeInitialize accepts any initializer and price (low). Merged three specialists. A stranger can open the only accepted pool at MIN_SQRT_PRICE+1, the factory's initialize then reverts permanently, and the ramp can run down before liquidity exists. The supplied proof fails on this code. It needs a non-atomic deploy-and-initialize, which the service says does not happen, so it is a deployment-ordering dependency.
• Single-sided IMD liquidity bypasses the snipe fee (low). Reproduced in a scratch test. The sniper paid about 29,864 IMD and withdrew about 30,515 WORK with zero hook fee, while a swapper at the same moment got about 31,034 WORK for 60,000 IMD. Passive and inherent to a fee-on-swap-only design.
• Fee rounds down to zero on dust (low). A 50 wei exact-in swap at 2% produced 48 wei output and no fee.
• Two info rows record the trust assumptions: the treasury can change the standing fee instantly ahead of a pending trade, which I measured as 96.77 versus 88.87 WORK on a 100 IMD trade, and IMD claims strand if the treasury can never receive IMD.

What I checked myself beyond the specialists. The hook delta accounting nets to zero in both swap modes, claims stay backed by manager balances across mixed swaps and a sweep, the unlock callback can only be reached by the hook's own unlock, the 0x2044 flags match the permissions and manifest, and the manifest constructor arguments and permissions match the compiled contract. The existing 47-test suite passes.

Proofs. The two supplied proof files are attached to findings 1 and 2. Both ran from test/scratch/ and fail on the current code for the reason each finding states.