Release Receipts (token symbol RCPT) on Sepolia as a univ4_hook launch.

Token: Receipts (RCPT), total supply 1,000,000,000 RCPT with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer (a separate zero-argument ERC-20, no mint, owner or admin).

Hook: SwapReceiptHook, a Uniswap v4 hook on the token's native-ETH pool that is also an ERC-721 (OpenZeppelin ERC721; collection name "Swap Receipts" and symbol "SWAPRCPT" are string literals in source, not constructor arguments).

In afterSwap, every buy (zeroForOne) whose ETH paid, |delta.amount0()| as the pool settled it (so exact-in and exact-out count alike), is at least 0.001 ETH mints one receipt to the hookData address (identity rule below); smaller buys, buys without a valid hookData address and sells mint nothing. Ids start at 1 and rise by one.

Each receipt stores ethPaid (uint128), tokensReceived (uint128, |delta.amount1()|), the pool's token (currency1), blockNumber and timestamp, and emits Receipt(id, owner, poolId, ethPaid, tokensReceived, blockNumber).

Receipts are soulbound: transfers, safeTransfers, approve and setApprovalForAll revert (override _update so only mints pass) and there is no burn.

Minting uses _mint, never _safeMint, so a contract recipient cannot revert a swap, and the minting afterSwap stays under 200,000 gas (a first mint to a new owner writes about six fresh storage slots, so 100,000 cannot hold). tokenURI(id) returns base64 on-chain JSON with an SVG showing the id, ETH paid (6 decimals), tokens received (whole tokens), token address and block, and reverts for ids that do not exist.

Views: totalMinted(), receiptOf(id), receiptsOf(owner, offset, limit) backed by a per-owner id list. No fee, no funds held, no admin. Receipts from other ETH pools on this hook record their own token, and the site shows only the launch token's.

Identity: the credited address is abi.decode(hookData, (address)) when hookData is exactly 32 bytes and non-zero; otherwise the swap credits nobody. As the context requires, there is no router-sender fallback: a router is a contract that could never claim. hookData is not authenticated: anyone can credit any address; say so in NatSpec and the README.

Deploy shape, matching the live Sepolia hook launches 170, 183 and 186 (launch 168 passed the mainnet PoolManager and is not a model): SwapReceiptHook's only constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager 0xE03A1074c86CFeDd5C142C4F04F1a1536e203543; every rate, window and threshold here is a source constant; there is no owner, admin, setter, pause, upgrade or sweep, and no $owner or $token argument.

Permissions are exactly afterSwap (low address bits 0x0040), all others false; the constructor calls Hooks.validateHookPermissions and the CREATE2 salt is mined for those bits.

The factory initializes the pool (currency0 native ETH, currency1 RCPT, fee 3000, tickSpacing 60) and seeds one-sided RCPT liquidity, so nothing in the hook may revert that initialize or that liquidity add (launch 138 was parked when a beforeInitialize gate reverted the factory), and the first buy lands in a pool that holds no ETH. All state is keyed by PoolId; a pool on this hook whose currency0 is not native ETH gets zero deltas and no other effect.

Every callback requires msg.sender == PoolManager.

Tests (Foundry, a real v4-core PoolManager deployed in the test, hook at a mined address): a launch rehearsal that initializes at the manifest price, seeds one-sided RCPT liquidity like the factory and makes the first buy into the ETH-less pool; exact-in and exact-out in both directions; dust amounts; a pool whose currency0 is not ETH; direct callback calls from a non-PoolManager address revert; fuzzed sizes; and specifically: a buy of exactly 0.001 ETH mints and 0.001 ETH minus 1 wei does not; exact-out buys use the settled ETH; a contract recipient without onERC721Received still gets its receipt; every transfer and approval path reverts; tokenURI decodes to JSON carrying the stored numbers; sells and buys without hookData mint nothing; the minting afterSwap stays under 200,000 gas.

An independent adversarial review (read-only) must attack: whether any input can make afterSwap revert and so block buys (storage, tokenURI, id growth, contract recipients); whether any transfer or operator path survives the soulbound override; under- or over-counting of ethPaid on exact-out and partial fills; and the unauthenticated-hookData spam (anyone can mint receipts to anyone for 0.001 ETH plus fees), which must be documented rather than silently accepted.

It reports each finding with the exact call sequence that triggers it.

Website: one static page (dist/index.html) that reads the hook's views and events and the pool price through Uniswap's Sepolia StateView 0xe1dd9c3fa50edb962e442f60dfbc432e24537e4c, with a buy/sell form that swaps through Uniswap's published Sepolia PoolSwapTest router 0x9b6b46e2c869aa39918db7f52f5557fe577b6eee (has code; manager() is the PoolManager above) and puts the connected wallet in hookData.

It shows a wallet's receipts gallery (connected or pasted address, rendering tokenURI images) and the latest 12 mints.