Created report and dataset: approximately 7,940 words, 85 labeled claims, and 13 explicit research gaps.

Local structure, reference-consistency, and arithmetic checks passed. These checks do not independently certify the sources.

Created artifacts/critique-a.md.

Checked ten central claims: nine hold; one remains unverifiable because its cited Elixir statements are inaccessible. The critique also identifies unsupported conclusions and material evidence gaps. Structural checks passed.

I've written the critique to artifacts/critique-b.md (about 4,000 words). It's the only file I changed, and it's left uncommitted as required. The report is careful about the claims it makes; its problem is which cases it picked. The cases closest to imdUSD's design are missing.

Main findings:

• Missing cases close to imdUSD:
  • Liquity v2 itself. It was redeployed after a Stability Pool issue found in February 2025 and relaunched on May 19, 2025. The report has no data on BOLD's actual peg or redemptions.
  • Felix feUSD. A Liquity-v2 fork backed mainly by HYPE, the nearest live match to imdUSD.
  • Failed Liquity-style forks: Raft R (November 2023, a mint bug in its collateral wrapper; R fell to about $0.18) and Prisma (March 2024, about $11M lost through a migration contract).
  • Other stablecoin incidents: Abracadabra MIM (January 2024), Yala YU (September 2025, a second unauthorized-mint case beside Resolv) and Falcon USDf (July 2025, which survived).
• The best own-token case is absent: loans against CRV inside Curve's own ecosystem. In July 2023 and June 2024, Curve founder Michael Egorov's CRV-backed loans ran to roughly $96–168M against thin on-chain CRV depth. The 2023 positions were unwound through private OTC sales; in 2024 one actor held over 90% of LlamaLend's crvUSD borrowing. The report treats the June 12, 2024 crvUSD incident only as a peg-keeper delay and doesn't connect it to these liquidations.
• Uniswap v4 hooks rest on a single success story. The report covers only StablePair and omits two hooks that lost funds through their own code: Cork (May 2025, about $11–12M, a depeg-protection product) and Bunni (September 2025, about $8.4M, later shut down).
• Survivorship and staleness: the designs that "survived" all had large stablecoin or custodial reserves. Ethena's "survival" leaves out USDe's supply falling from about $14.7B to $6.4B by December 2025. Several figures (Ethena's backing mix, crvUSD ceilings, GHO peg stats) have newer sources.
• Self-reported evidence: the positive results lean on issuer data or paid risk providers, such as Curve's own monthly recap and Ethena's risk committee. The only independent crvUSD study in the report shows the peg getting worse.
• Stresses the design section never models:
  • Collateral depth shrinks under stress, because redemptions and liquidations hand out IMD that gets sold into the same thin market. The report's ceiling formula treats depth as fixed.
  • Thin-token price feeds can be manipulated (Polter Finance, November 2024), and the hook pool may also be the price source.
  • Staked collateral can't be sold during unbonding.
  • The stablecoin can trade above $1 when there's no reserve to sell from.
  • Holders of the collateral token can capture governance.
  • A single borrower or LP can hold most of the supply.
  • Adding collateral types means new migration contracts, a stress window of its own.
  • Redemptions can grind supply down slowly over months.

The critique also proposes six new research gaps (G14–G19) for the dataset; I didn't add them to data.json, since that's outside my scope.

The cases I add come from web searches today, mostly press and auditor write-ups; I haven't checked them against primary sources. Loss figures and price lows often conflict, so I gave ranges. A few leads are marked unconfirmed (Compound's proposal 289, the Paxos PYUSD mint error, Celo's CELO reserve share, VAI, USDN, Nerite). I didn't re-check the report's citations, which was outside this task.

I've written the revised report (artifacts/report-v2.md), the revised dataset (artifacts/data-v2.json) and the point-by-point response (artifacts/response.md). The dataset parses as JSON and every claim has a valid label; nothing else was checked beyond that.

Critique A: I accepted all ten points. One change matters:

• C048 (Elixir's November 2025 statements): relabelled from fact to uncertain. Neither the mirrored copies nor the original X posts could be read. Elixir's own docs now support only the end state: deUSD is shut down and has a separate USDC claims process.
• C015 (GHO stability module): now credits the $3.5M cap and 0.2% fee figures to Gauntlet's December 2, 2023 reply rather than the thread's opening post.
• C076 (debt-ceiling formula): now says it limits only the share of debt that gets liquidated or redeemed. With a small share it allows total debt above market depth, so it is not a validated ceiling.

Critique B: I checked its leads against sources before adding anything. Claims C086–C110 and gaps G14–G20 are new.

• crvUSD, June 12, 2024: the LlamaRisk report itself ties the upward depeg to a liquidation cascade in the market lending crvUSD against CRV. That makes the report's main peg-keeper case an own-token-collateral case as well (C086). It does not name the borrower or give a bad-debt figure, so those press figures are marked uncertain.
• Liquity v2's 2025 Stability Pool issue and May 19, 2025 relaunch: confirmed on Liquity's blog and added (C094, C095).
• Prisma (C096): confirmed from its post-mortem. The total loss was 3,479 ETH; the critique's 3,257 ETH was one attacker's share.
• Raft and Yala (C097, C098): added only partly. Raft's root cause in a collateral wrapper wasn't verified. The Block puts Yala's next-day range at $0.70–0.95, not the critique's $0.2046 low, so the lows are recorded as conflicting.
• Felix feUSD (C099): added from Three Sigma's audit case study. I could not find its HYPE backing share or its price on October 10–11, 2025.
• Cork and Bunni Uniswap v4 hook losses (C087–C089): added. For Cork I used its post-mortem's wording (hook authorization flaw plus a rollover pricing flaw), not the critique's "exchange-rate provider".
• USDe supply (C100, C101): fell from $14.7B to $6.3B between October 9 and December 24, 2025. This comes from ForkLog citing CoinGecko, a secondary source.
• New design points (C102–C108): collateral depth that shrinks under the stablecoin's own stress, oracle attacks on thin tokens, pressure above $1, hook code security, governance capture, single-borrower concentration, and risk during migrations.
• Source relationships (C109): a table showing which findings rest on the issuer's own or close-party sources.

What I didn't do:

• I made no live on-chain reads, so the out-of-date figures B flagged are unchanged and listed in G19.
• About ten of B's leads went unchecked and are listed in G20 rather than reported. These include Abracadabra, Falcon, Polter, Mento and Compound Proposal 289.
• 15 claims in data-v2.json have an empty source list. Most are design inferences that point to other claim IDs. C091 and C092 have no sources because the press reports behind them weren't read.
• The revised report is about 10,600 words, above the 8,000-word aim, because the original text is kept in full.

The three output files are left untracked, as instructed.

Recorded two medium-severity findings in .imd-findings.json:

• C093 confuses collateral value with borrowed debt.
• C009 reports incompatible block-count and elapsed-time figures.

Both include concrete reproductions. No high or critical findings. All input artifacts remain unchanged.