Implemented SOOTH: 1 billion tokens, 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. Dependencies are vendored; deployment responsibilities and the assumption that undefined “M” adds no behavior are documented.

Validation passed: forge build, all 32 tests using your fuzz seed, and forge fmt --check.

Full launch integration remains for the verifier.

I found no defects. SoothToken (src/SoothToken.sol) is an unmodified OpenZeppelin ERC‑20 that mints exactly 1,000,000,000 × 10¹⁸ tokens to the deployer in its constructor.

.imd-findings.json has an empty findings list and a coverage row for each of the three listed entry points, all marked holds. It also has a fourth row for the supply invariant.

• approve, transfer, transferFrom: these are the library's own code, with no fee, burn, tax or blocklist. So the launch transfers (factory to distributor, pool seeding, remainder) and trades through the pool move exactly the amounts stated.
• Supply: it is fixed. The constructor is the only place that mints, and there is no owner, burn, pause or upgrade path, so nobody can grow the supply or move or freeze a holder's balance.
• Static analysis lead: aderyn's "large numeric literal" warning on line 12 is just the INITIAL_SUPPLY constant written out, not a defect.

The economics guides check fees, taxes, rebasing, mint authority and launch-flow shortfalls, and none of those exist in this token. I didn't run Foundry tests, because I had no finding to prove.

I found no defects in SOOTH. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list plus a coverage row for each entry point, and it parses as valid JSON. No tracked files changed.

What the code is: src/SoothToken.sol is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.1 ERC20 with nothing overridden. Its constructor mints INITIAL_SUPPLY = 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18 once to msg.sender, which on the launch path is the factory. There is no owner, minting after deployment, burning, pause, upgrade, fee or hook.

Execution trace: I read transfer, transferFrom and approve through _spendAllowance, _transfer, _update and _approve in the vendored OpenZeppelin ERC20.sol.

• Sending to the zero address, spending more than the balance, or exceeding the allowance all revert.
• A transfer to yourself leaves the balance unchanged.
• An unlimited (type(uint256).max) allowance is never reduced.
• None of the three makes an external call, so there is nothing to re-enter.

Periphery (launch flows): Nothing is taken on transfer, so the factory's payments to the distributor and the pool arrive in full, distributor claims pay in full, and swaps settle in full both ways. Supply can't grow and no privileged call can move or freeze a holder's balance. There is no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, and decimals() is 18.

First principles: Total supply stays at exactly 1e27 base units (one billion tokens at 18 decimals) for good, since the constructor is the only place tokens are minted. The usual race when an approval is changed from one non-zero value to another is built into the ERC-20 standard, not a defect here, so I didn't report it.

Coverage: all three entry points, approve, transfer and transferFrom, are marked holds. I added a fourth row for the fixed-supply rule.

Static analysis: aderyn flagged a "large numeric literal" at line 12. That is the supply constant, written with underscores and 10 ** 18 so it reads clearly, so it isn't a defect. Slither reported nothing.

Tests: the repository's 32 tests, including a fuzz run of 1,024 cases, all pass.

Limits: I didn't run the protected launch tests. They import LaunchLiquidity, PoolInitializationGuard and HookFlags from src/, and those files aren't in this tree. I also didn't review launch.json, because none exists yet.

I found no defects in the math audit of SOOTH, so .imd-findings.json has an empty findings list plus a coverage row for each of the three entry points and two invariants. I changed no repository files, and the existing test suite passes (32 of 32, including the 1,024-run fuzz test).

What the code is: src/SoothToken.sol is a plain OpenZeppelin v5.1.0 ERC-20 (the vendored library's code matches upstream). Its constructor mints 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18 to msg.sender once. There are no mint, burn, fee, owner or upgrade functions.

Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap checks:

• Supply: 1e27 is calculated when the contract compiles, cannot overflow, and matches the 18 decimals. Nothing after the constructor can change the total, so the total supply always equals the sum of all balances.
• The unchecked arithmetic in the transfer code is safe:
  • The sender's balance is subtracted only after a check that it covers the amount.
  • The recipient's balance can't overflow, because no balance can exceed the 1e27 total.
• Allowances: transferFrom checks the allowance before subtracting from it. An allowance of type(uint256).max is never reduced. If the transfer then fails, the whole transaction reverts, so the allowance isn't lost.
• Boundaries: sending zero, sending to yourself, sending your full balance and sending one base unit all leave balances exact. Sends to or from the zero address revert.
• Launch split: the 10% swarm share and the 80% pool seed divide 1e27 with no remainder, and transfers deliver exactly what is sent.
• Static analysis lead: aderyn's large-numeric-literal flag at line 12 is about style, not a defect.

Coverage: approve, transfer and transferFrom are all marked "holds", as are the fixed-supply and exact-launch-split invariants. I didn't run the protected v4 launch test, because it needs the network's launch harness and its environment inputs.

Created launch.json matching SoothToken, its exact supply, empty constructor arguments, and the specified pool and economics.

forge build succeeded; all 32 tests passed with the supplied fuzz seed. Only launch.json is changed for submission.

The review is complete. No defects were found in the assigned area, and .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list with eleven coverage rows. The working tree is otherwise unchanged.

What was reviewed

• src/SoothToken.sol is a 17-line wrapper over OpenZeppelin ERC-20 that mints the whole supply to the deployer in the constructor. It has no owner, roles, initializer, setters, mint, burn, pause, or fallback.
• The vendored OpenZeppelin files pass their checksum manifest and diff byte-identical against the upstream v5.1.0 tag, so the inherited transfer and allowance logic is the audited standard implementation.
• The compiled ABI exposes exactly the three listed entry points. A reachable-opcode scan of the runtime finds no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT, or any external-call opcode.

Checks run against the three guides

• Access Control: every storage write is keyed on the caller or gated by the allowance check. A scratch fuzz test over random selectors, payloads, and callers confirmed that nothing outside approve, transfer, and transferFrom dispatches. The deployer has no standing over other holders after construction.
• Asymmetry: transfer and transferFrom share one internal path, and allowance spending exactly mirrors approve. The zero-address mint and burn branches are unreachable from public functions.
• Trust Gap: there is no privileged actor, setter, fee, or pricing formula after construction, so none of the seams exist. The factory holding the full supply at construction is the launch design.

Notes that are not findings

• The ERC-20 approve-replacement race is inherent to the standard and documented in the README.
• The aderyn large-numeric-literal lead is a style note; the literal equals the manifest supply.
• The brief's feature description is a single letter, "M". The builder implemented a plain ERC-20 and documented that choice. If the requester intended a feature, that is a scope question for them, not a code defect.

The existing 32 project tests and the format check also pass.

Added two test files under test/ covering failure paths, boundary values, allowance rollback, and stateful invariants.

forge build and seeded forge test pass: 40 tests, including 32,768 invariant handler calls. No implementation defects found.

I found no defects to report. .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and a coverage record, and the JSON parses correctly.

What I checked

• The token: src/SoothToken.sol is a standard OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-20 with nothing overridden. Its constructor takes no arguments and mints INITIAL_SUPPLY = 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18 (1e27) once to msg.sender, which is the factory.
• The library: I read the vendored copy of OpenZeppelin's ERC-20 code and found no tampering. transfer, transferFrom, approve, _update, _spendAllowance and _approve all match the standard code.
• Launch requirements:
  • Transfers move exactly the amount asked, with no fee, burn or hook, so the distributor share, the pool seed, swaps and the remainder all arrive whole.
  • There is no owner, pause, blacklist, mint or burn function.
  • The deployed code has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT and is about 1.8 KB, far below the 24,576-byte limit.
• launch.json: It only uses keys the schema allows. constructorArgs: [] matches the constructor, decimals are 18, totalSupply equals 1e27, the contract name SoothToken is valid, and the economics are copied verbatim.
• Tests: forge build succeeds and the project's own suite passes (40 of 40). I did not run the protected launch tests; they need the network's separate launch harness.

Specialist and tool leads

• None of the four specialists or the independent tester reported a finding, so there was nothing to reproduce or merge.
• Aderyn's "large numeric literal" warning at line 12 is not a defect: the constant is correct and matches the manifest.

Coverage: all three entry points (approve, transfer, transferFrom) are marked holds. I added two invariant rows: the supply stays fixed at 1e27, and the manifest matches a deployable token.

The brief's feature description is cut off at "M". The README says the implementation treats that as unspecified, so I couldn't treat it as a requirement the code misses. I changed no files apart from .imd-findings.json.