Implemented DRIP and TokenFaucet with vendored dependencies, ABI exports, deployment documentation, and adversarial/invariant tests.

Verified with Solidity 0.8.26:

• forge build passed.
• All 38 tests passed, including offline with an empty environment.
• Formatting and ABI consistency checks passed.

Independent review and launch.json remain separate workflow assignments.

Created launch.json for Drip and TokenFaucet(["$token"]).

• Validated the supplied schema and compiled constructor ABIs.
• forge build passed.
• forge test: 38 passed, zero failures.
• Only launch.json changed outside permitted scratch artifacts.

Review complete. No blocking findings. All four requested attacks fail against the accepted source, and the manifest is correct. Findings are written to .imd-findings.json (three info-level observations, none reopening the work). No repository files were changed.

What I ran

• forge build, forge test, forge fmt --check and the ABI export check in the repo: 38 tests passed, exports match the compiled contracts.
• Both protected floors from the pinned reads, executed in a scratch project against the real creation code with a simulated CREATE2 factory and Sepolia chain id: 8 of 8 passed.
• Eight adversarial probes in a scratch project outside the repo, covering the attacks below plus malformed metadata and a mirror token.

Requested attacks

• Reentrancy through a malicious token. Fails. Both donate and claim share the OpenZeppelin guard, and the nested call from a token's transfer or transferFrom reverts with ReentrancyGuardReentrantCall in all eight outer/inner/same-or-other-pool combinations. balanceOf and decimals are declared view, so they run under STATICCALL and cannot mutate state. In claim, the next-claim timestamp is stored before the transfer. The only residue is read-only: during a donate callback, the donor views already show the tentative donor while donatedBy is still 0. That is confined to the token's own list and is rolled back on failure.
• decimals() manipulation. Fails beyond the token's own pool. The nominal amount is capped at decimals 30 and then capped again by the faucet's balance of that same token, so the worst case is a token emptying its own pool, which the README declares as an accepted trust assumption. A token returning a word above 255 or empty return data reverts with empty data rather than UnsupportedDecimals, which is a message-quality observation only.
• Cooldown bypass across tokens. Fails. The timestamp is keyed by token and account, and the tests cover the exact boundary, timestamp zero, and a second token not resetting the first. A mirror token that reports another token's balance cannot move that balance because the faucet never grants an allowance. Many-address claims are permitted by the spec.
• Donor-list growth griefing the paginated view. Fails. donorCount is a single storage read and donors does at most 100 reads regardless of list size. A 1,005-donor list pages within a 500,000 gas budget in the repo test, and extreme offsets and limits cannot overflow.

Manifest

launch.json lists LaunchToken with no constructor arguments and one application contract TokenFaucet with ["$token"]. That matches constructor(address featuredToken_) in the source and in the exported ABI. The argument grants no role. The contract stores it as an immutable display default, never reads msg.sender in the constructor, has no owner, withdraw, pause, or upgrade path, and every non-view function is nonpayable. Token metadata, decimals, and supply match the workflow, contract names are unique and do not use the reserved name, and the pool fields match the Sepolia guidance.

Test coverage note

The suite exercises every case the workflow lists, including fuzzed reentrancy and a stateful invariant with an independent model. The only untested edge I found is malformed decimals() return data, which is recorded as the first info finding.

Implemented the frontend, static export, deployment manifest, and validation evidence.

• Build/typecheck, 8 unit tests, and 16 browser scenarios passed.
• Prospective Git bundle: 907,829 bytes, below 8 MiB.
• No transactions broadcast.

Git metadata is read-only, so files remain uncommitted for network collection. The root write restriction required placing the design record at docs/DESIGN.md.

Results and limitations: VALIDATION.md.