Release Pawn (ERC-20 symbol PAWN) on Sepolia as an evm_project: the fixed-supply launch token plus one application contract.

Token: Pawn (PAWN), total supply 1,000,000,000 PAWN with 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer.

Application contract: NFTPawnShop, peer-to-peer ETH loans against any ERC-721. It has no constructor arguments (constructorArgs []), no owner, no admin and no fees, and no receive/fallback: ETH arrives only through fund and repay.

PAWN is only the launch token; loans are in ETH because the app is about ETH credit. request(nft, tokenId, principal, interest, duration): principal > 0 wei, interest >= 0 wei (a flat amount), duration 1 hour to 365 days; the NFT is pulled with transferFrom after the borrower's approve and ownerOf(tokenId) == this is checked afterwards; state Requested. cancel(loanId): borrower only, Requested only; NFT returned. fund(loanId) payable: Requested only, msg.value == principal exactly; the caller becomes lender (anyone, even the borrower); deadline = block.timestamp + duration; the principal is credited to the borrower's withdrawable balance; state Funded. repay(loanId) payable: Funded only, block.timestamp <= deadline, msg.value == principal + interest exactly, callable by anyone but the NFT always returns to the borrower; lender credited; state Repaid. claim(loanId): lender only, Funded, block.timestamp > deadline; NFT to the lender; state Defaulted. withdraw(): pull all credited ETH.

NFTs go out with transferFrom (not safeTransferFrom) so a receiver hook cannot block repay or claim. The contract does not implement onERC721Received, so stray safeTransfers revert; a plain transferFrom sent outside request() is not tracked (document). All state changes happen before external calls; every external function is nonReentrant, because the NFT contract is arbitrary and may be malicious.

Accepted risk, stated in the README and on the site next to every loan's collection address: the shop cannot vouch for a collection, so a fake ERC-721 (lying ownerOf) or one whose transfers revert can cost its lender the principal; lenders choose which collections to trust. The reviewer confirms the shop itself never loses or double-pays ETH on such a collection rather than treating the lender's choice as a finding.

Views: loanCount(), loan(id), withdrawable(address).

Events: Requested, Cancelled, Funded, Repaid, Claimed, Withdrawn. Tests (Foundry) must cover: every state transition and role; the deadline boundary (repay at == deadline, claim at deadline + 1 s); a malicious re-entrant ERC-721 mock; and the invariants that the ETH balance == sum of withdrawable and every Requested or Funded loan's NFT is owned by the shop.

The independent adversarial review must attack: the repay/claim race at the deadline second, re-entrancy through a malicious ERC-721 in request, cancel, repay and claim, fake NFT contracts that lie about ownerOf, re-pawning the same NFT after it is returned, and ETH stuck on any path.

Deploy through the project factory, then publish a one-page website to request a loan (approve the NFT, then request), list open requests and active loans with deadlines, fund, repay, claim, cancel and withdraw. Lists come from contract views and events only (no backend, no indexer; log queries are chunked from the deployment block). Keep it to one small page; the static export has index.html in dist/.