Review complete. The findings file is written and validated against the source tree; no tracked file was changed.

Outcome: no critical, high or medium defects in SqueekSupplyBoard. The contract does what the brief requires and contains nothing the launch forbids.

What I read

• src/SqueekSupplyBoard.sol in full, plus the OpenZeppelin bases it inherits under lib (EIP712, ECDSA, Ownable, Ownable2Step).
• The project's own Foundry suite, which passes 8 of 8 tests under forge 1.8.3.
• The backend signing path and the frontend call encoding, to confirm the EIP-712 type string, domain name and version, and pinScore parameter order all match the chain side. They do.
• Nothing in scope was unreachable.

What I verified

• All state writes in pinScore happen after signature recovery. Replay of a runId, non-increasing score, expired deadline, zero identifiers and a changed configHash for a locked challenge all revert as specified.
• Compiled runtime contains no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT or CREATE. The only reachable external call is the ecrecover precompile via STATICCALL.
• No payable function, no token or ETH custody, no proxy, initializer, mint, pause, freeze or blacklist.
• Constructor is nonpayable, calls no other contract, rejects a zero owner or signer, and takes an explicit owner argument, so ownership cannot be trapped at the factory.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json

• Low: rotating the signer immediately invalidates every unexpired attestation already issued to players, adding a hidden second expiry beyond the 24-hour deadline. Owner-only trigger, no fund loss, reproduced in a scratch test.
• Info: inherited renounceOwnership permanently disables signer rotation if ever called.
• Info: a coverage record stating the above, the opcode scan result, and the expected manifest constructor arguments, which are the owner and public signer addresses stated in the brief as static values.

For the manifest step: a single contract entry with those two static addresses. No launch.json exists in the tree yet, which is expected at this stage.

The scratch test lives under test/scratch and is not part of the submission. forge-std was cloned to /tmp only for that run, since the repository does not vendor it.

Done. The board was already launch-compatible, so the source changes are only the two audit findings that reproduced.

Launch compatibility (no change needed). The constructor already takes explicit owner and signer addresses, is nonpayable, calls no other contract, and the runtime has no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT. The protected build files are untouched. I added a launch-shape test that deploys through a CREATE2 probe acting as the factory and checks owner, signer, payability, runtime size, opcodes and the EIP-712 domain.

Audit findings, all three reproduced or assessed:

• Signer rotation (low) — fixed. The replaced signer now stays valid for a 24-hour grace window, matching the backend's attestation deadline, so unexpired attestations survive a rotation. A new owner-only revoke ends the window early for a leaked key. Every existing function, event, error and the domain stay the same. Additions are three getters, one function and one event.
• renounceOwnership (info) — fixed. It now reverts, since an ownerless board could never rotate its signer again. Two-step transfer is unchanged.
• Coverage record (info) — no change. It reports no defect. Its opcode and constructor checks are now kept as regression tests.

Deliverables:

• src/SqueekSupplyBoard.sol with both fixes
• contracts/test/SqueekSupplyBoard.t.sol extended to 22 tests; original eight kept with the same assertions
• contracts/test/SqueekSupplyBoardLaunch.t.sol with 4 launch-shape tests
• docs/abi/SqueekSupplyBoard.json exported from the build
• ADAPTATION.md listing each change, its file and the rule or finding behind it
• README.md gains a short subsection on signer rotation and the new constant

Checks. Clean build and the full suite with the verifier's fuzz seed pass, 26 of 26. No launch.json was written. The project's Node test suite was not run because it needs dependencies that are not installed and would have to be committed under a protected path.

Created launch.json for SqueekSupplyBoard with $owner and the approved signer.

Validated the manifest against the compiled ABI. forge build succeeded; all 26 tests passed with the required fuzz seed. Only launch.json changed outside scratch artifacts.

I found one low-severity problem in SqueekSupplyBoard and nothing at medium or above. The findings and coverage are in .imd-findings.json. I made no other changes, and the temporary test is deleted.

Finding 1 (low): a second setSigner within 24 hours breaks the rotation promise.

• Where: src/SqueekSupplyBoard.sol:62.
• Cause: the contract remembers only one previous signer. The code comment says "a rotation never cuts off an attestation a player already holds", and the backend gives every attestation a 24-hour deadline (server/app.js:427).
• Trigger: the owner rotates from signer A to B, then from B to C within 24 hours. Calling setSigner with the current signer again has the same effect.
• Effect: scores A signed are still within their deadline but now fail with BadSignature(). Those players can no longer pin them to the leaderboard. No funds are involved, and only the owner can cause it.
• Reproduced: a temporary Foundry test signed with A, rotated A→B, then B→C an hour later, and pinned an hour after that. The pin failed with BadSignature(), as the finding states.
• Fix options: block a new setSigner while a grace window is open (unless revokePreviousSigner was called) and reject setting the current signer again. Or change the comment to say only the immediately previous signer is honoured.

What holds:

• pinScore: the signed message covers the caller's address, chain and deadline, so a score can't be stolen, front-run or replayed on another chain. Each run ID works once, a new score must beat the player's previous best, and the deadline includes the last second. Each challenge locks one config hash, and malleable signatures are rejected.
• No money involved: the contract holds no ETH or tokens and has no fees or payouts.
• Ownership: it is two-step, giving up ownership is disabled, and the owner is a constructor argument rather than the deploying factory.
• revokePreviousSigner: it clears the old signer, and a cleared slot can't match any signature.

Each of the five entry points has a coverage row; four hold and setSigner points to finding 1. There is also a row for the no-custody, no-fees check.

Tool leads:

• Slither's timestamp warnings: these are the deadline and grace-window checks working as intended, so I didn't report them.
• Aderyn's centralization warning: this is the owner's power to change the signer, which the brief asks for. I count it as a trust assumption, not a defect.

There was no launch.json to review, because the manifest step hasn't run yet.

The repo doesn't vendor forge-std, so I ran the test from test/scratch/ with a small inline cheat-code interface, as the existing tests do. For the same reason, a test that imports forge-std/Test.sol, as the proof format asks, won't compile here. A low finding doesn't need a proof, so I didn't attach one.

The review is complete. The findings file is written and validated, the scratch tests are removed, and the tree is otherwise untouched.

Outcome: the math is sound. I found no precision, boundary or numerical-gap defect in SqueekSupplyBoard. One informational note is recorded.

What I checked, with a scratch Foundry suite that ran and passed against the current code:

• Timestamp arithmetic. The grace window is computed as a uint64 cast of the block timestamp plus the constant. This is checked arithmetic. It reverts rather than wrapping, and only at a timestamp beyond year 584 billion.
• Inclusive edges. The attestation deadline and the grace cutoff both use the same inclusive comparison. The boundary second is accepted and the next second is rejected in both cases. A zero deadline is always expired.
• Score boundary. A zero score is rejected by the strict comparison against the zero default. The uint64 maximum is accepted and then unbeatable, which is the intended monotonic rule.
• Signature input boundary. Empty, 64-byte and all-zero 65-byte signatures revert inside OpenZeppelin ECDSA, so the recovered address is never zero and can never match a cleared previous signer.
• Single rotation guarantee. An attestation issued at any time before a rotation keeps its full deadline inside the grace window.
• ABI export. The file under docs/abi is identical to the compiled ABI.

The one note (info). The NatSpec on lines 16-17 says a rotation "never cuts off an attestation a player already holds". Two rotations inside one 24-hour window do cut off the oldest key's unexpired attestations, because only one previous signer is stored. ADAPTATION.md already documents this limit, and it requires owner action, so it is not a security defect. The reproduction and a minimal fix are in the findings file.

Coverage. All five listed entry points have rows. Four hold. setSigner points at the informational note. Three extra rows record the invariants and the ABI check.

Static analysis leads: both Slither timestamp lines are the deadline and grace comparisons that the design requires, and the Aderyn centralization line is the brief's owner role. Neither is a defect.

The review is complete. The findings file is written and no source, test or configuration file was changed.

Result: one low finding, all five entry points covered.

• Finding 1 (low), src/SqueekSupplyBoard.sol line 62. The signer rotation added by the adaptation keeps the replaced key valid for a fresh 24-hour window on every setSigner call. Ending that window takes a second, non-atomic owner transaction. A leaked key therefore still pins forged scores and locks challenge configs after the owner has rotated away from it, until the revoke lands or the window expires. I reproduced this with a scratch Foundry test: two attestations signed by the old key after the rotation both pinned successfully. The contract holds no funds, so impact is a forged leaderboard. The grace window was requested by an earlier accepted audit finding, so the judge may keep it as a documented trust assumption. The suggested minimal fix is an owner-only atomic replace function alongside the unchanged setSigner(address) ABI.

What held. pinScore ordering and every revert path, the EIP-712 digest against the server's typed data and the frontend encoder, OpenZeppelin 5.6.1 ECDSA.recover rejecting malleable or zero recoveries, two-step ownership with renounce disabled, the empty-chain constructor rehearsal, the opcode and size invariants, and the exported ABI, which diffs byte-for-byte against the compiled one. Build and all 26 existing tests pass offline.

Not reached. There is no launch.json in the tree yet, so the manifest row is marked unreached with the expected shape noted for the manifest step. The Slither timestamp lines are the intended deadline and grace comparisons, and the aderyn centralization line is the brief's owner role, so neither became a finding.

I found three problems in the permission review of SqueekSupplyBoard: one medium and two low. They are in .imd-findings.json, along with coverage for all 5 entry points and 3 invariant checks. I changed no tracked files. My scratch tests and the build outputs my runs created in the repo are deleted, and git status shows nothing.

Findings

1. Medium: a leaked signer key can permanently lock future daily challenges (src/SqueekSupplyBoard.sol:107). The first pin for a challenge fixes its configHash, and nothing else can change it. Daily challenge IDs are predictable (server/challenges.js:115). So anyone holding a signer key, even the old one during its 24h grace period, can pin each future day with a junk configHash. Rotating with setSigner and then calling revokePreviousSigner doesn't clear those locks. Every honest pinScore for those days then reverts with InvalidConfiguration, and the owner has no way to repair it. Its proof test fails today with InvalidConfiguration().
2. Low: re-setting the active signer ends the old signer's grace early (:61). Calling setSigner with the signer that is already active doesn't revert. It overwrites previousSigner, so attestations players already hold from the replaced key revert with BadSignature. It also makes a later revokePreviousSigner emit an event naming a signer that is still active. Its proof test fails today with BadSignature().
3. Low: a compromised key can't be cut off in one transaction (:63). Every rotation gives the old key 24h of grace. For the first rotation, revoking can't be done in advance: it reverts when there is no previous signer. With an ordinary wallet as owner, the leaked key still works between the setSigner and revokePreviousSigner transactions. No proof test, since it is low severity.

Coverage

• Holds: acceptOwnership and transferOwnership (OpenZeppelin 5.6.1 two-step ownership), and revokePreviousSigner.
• Holds (invariants): renounceOwnership is disabled for every caller, the constructor rejects zero owner and signer addresses, and docs/abi/SqueekSupplyBoard.json exactly matches the compiled ABI.
• Finding: pinScore (finding 1) and setSigner (findings 2 and 3).
• Checked, no problem: pinScore ties the player to the caller, uses each runId only once, signs over chain ID and contract address, and rejects malleable signatures.
• Not reported: two real rotations within 24h dropping the older key. The previous contributor's tests and ADAPTATION.md treat that as intended.
• The two static-analysis leads: the timestamp comparisons are the intended deadline and grace checks. The centralization lead is the intended owner role.

Checks

• The project's own forge test run passes: 26 of 26.
• forge-std isn't vendored in lib/. To run the proof tests I cloned it to /tmp and passed it in as a command-line remapping. Neither foundry.toml nor remappings.txt was changed.

Added failure-path, fuzz, and stateful tests under test/.

sh test/check.sh passes both builds and suites: 26 existing checks, 44 new checks, and 16,384 randomized calls using the required seed.

Reported one low-severity defect in .imd-findings.json: repeated signer updates prematurely invalidate outstanding attestations. Includes a reproduced failing proof.

Source and configuration remain unchanged.

The review is complete. The findings file is written, the scratch directory is removed, and git reports no tracked file changed.

What I did. I ran the accepted suite and the contributed adversarial suite as a baseline. Both pass, 70 tests in total. I then ran the three specialist proofs under test/scratch with forge-std fetched outside the repository. All three fail on the current code for exactly the reason their findings state. I also confirmed the backend's typed-data domain, field order and 24-hour deadline match the contract, that the committed ABI export is identical to the compiled ABI, and that both manifest addresses are correctly checksummed.

Findings kept, after merging seven specialist reports into three and adding one of my own:

1. Medium. A challengeConfig lock written by a leaked signer key is permanent. The owner can rotate and revoke the key, but no function clears the lock, so every honest pin for that predictable future day reverts forever. The backend never checks the on-chain lock, so it keeps issuing attestations that cannot land. No proof attached, because a fix-agnostic test cannot name the recovery function. The specialist's proof reproduces it and is cited.

2. Medium, mine. The manifest fills the owner argument with $owner although the brief states the owner address. The manifest guidance requires a stated owner to be written as a static word. If the paying wallet differs from the stated owner, the only privileged role lands on the wrong party. The signer argument already follows the static rule, so the manifest is inconsistent with itself.

3. Low, merged from four reports. Every setSigner call overwrites the single previousSigner slot, including a no-op re-set of the current signer. That drops an unexpired key's grace window and contradicts the NatSpec promise. The attached proof covers the no-op case and accepts either a revert or a no-op fix. The double-rotation variant is a documented design limit.

4. Low, merged from two reports. setSigner always grants the replaced key a fresh 24-hour window, and revocation is a separate owner transaction that cannot be sent first on the initial rotation. Forged pins are accepted in the gap. This is the trade-off of the accepted grace-window design.

Dropped. The Slither timestamp leads are the intended deadline and grace comparisons. The Aderyn centralization lead is the owner role the brief asks for and is recorded as a trust assumption, not a defect.

Coverage. All five entry points are answered. Two are marked holds, two carry findings, and the constructor, deployability, and ABI export rows are included as extra checks. Nothing else in the contract failed my own pass: signature binding, replay protection, reentrancy surface, size and opcode constraints, and the two-step ownership path all hold.

All three review findings reproduced against the accepted code, and all three are now fixed, tested and answered in .imd-responses.json.

What reproduced. A scratch test run before any change confirmed each report. A replaced signer's leaked key could pre-lock a future day's challengeConfig to junk with no owner remedy once revoked. Re-calling setSigner with the active key overwrote the replaced key's grace window. And setSigner alone always granted a leaked key a fresh 24-hour window, with no single-transaction way to end it.

Changes in src/SqueekSupplyBoard.sol (all additive; constructor, existing ABI, storage prefix, EIP-712 domain and typehash unchanged):

• Lock recovery. The first pin for a challenge now also records which signer wrote the lock. A new owner-only clearChallengeConfig removes a lock only when that signer is retired, meaning neither the current signer nor an unexpired previous one. Locks by keys still in service stay immutable, and clearing never touches pins, spent run ids or bests.
• Same-signer guard. setSigner rejects the already active address, so a retried call cannot drop the grace window of the key actually replaced. The documented single-slot behaviour for two genuine rotations is unchanged.
• Emergency rotation. A new owner-only replaceSigner installs the new key and clears the previous-signer window in one transaction. setSigner remains the planned-rotation path.

Verification. forge build succeeds and forge test with the verifier's fuzz seed passes 40 of 40 tests, up from 26. The 14 new tests include each reviewer's exact sequence end to end, a fuzz test over the retirement boundary, and checks that clearing cannot reopen run ids or lower a best. The launch-shape tests still pass, since the constructor is untouched.

Docs. ADAPTATION.md gains sections 8 to 11 describing each change, the finding behind it and its tests. README's signer-rotation subsection documents the three new behaviours. The ABI export in docs/abi was regenerated. The backend was deliberately left alone, as noted in ADAPTATION.md, since the on-chain remedy does not depend on it.

The finding reproduced and is fixed. The brief in workflow.md states the owner address outright, and the manifest rule writes a brief-stated owner as a static word rather than as a placeholder that resolves from the launch request.

What changed:

• launch.json now passes the owner as the static address 0x51404e4a699e4e338e143fb2a45c5cdc96392575 for initialOwner. The signer argument was already static and is unchanged.
• Notes now say both constructor arguments are the addresses the brief states, instead of claiming that a placeholder resolves to the owner.
• .imd-responses.json answers the finding with verdict "fixed" and describes the change.

Verification results:

Check	Result
forge build	compiled, lint warnings only
forge test with verifier fuzz seed	40 passed, 0 failed
manifest shape (keys, kind, notes length)	ok
git status	only launch.json modified

The manifest still lists the single contract SqueekSupplyBoard with two arguments in the order of its constructor, initialOwner then initialSigner, and no token, pool, ETH or initialization fields. No source, test or configuration file was touched.

I've updated the test suite for the revised SqueekSupplyBoard source. All tests pass with the required fuzz seed: 66 in test/ and the 40 already-accepted ones in contracts/test. I found no new defect, so there is no .imd-findings.json.

foundry.toml points at contracts/test, so a plain forge test only runs the accepted suite. sh test/check.sh runs both directories without changing any configuration.

What changed in the source since my last round

• setSigner now refuses to re-set the active signer.
• A new emergency replaceSigner cuts off the old key immediately, with no grace period.
• The board now records which key wrote each challenge's lock (challengeConfigSigner).
• A new owner-only clearChallengeConfig clears a lock once the key that wrote it is out of service.

New file: test/SqueekKeyRecovery.t.sol (21 tests, including one fuzz test at 1,000 runs)

• Re-setting the active signer: both setSigner and replaceSigner reject it and leave the grace window exactly as it was. Rotating back to the previous key swaps the two. A second planned rotation keeps only the latest replaced key, as the source's comments now say.
• replaceSigner: both the replaced key and any previous key still in grace stop working in the same call. It emits the right events, rejects the zero address and the active signer without side effects, keeps scores, used run IDs and locks, and only the owner can call it.
• Lock signer: the key that writes the first lock is recorded and never overwritten. Rejected pins record nothing.
• clearChallengeConfig: it refuses an unlocked challenge, a second clear, and any lock whose key is still in service. That means the current signer, a previous signer still in grace (checked up to the exact cutoff second), and a key that was reinstated. It clears locks of revoked, expired or replaced keys.
  • The "leaked key" scenario is covered end to end: a junk lock is cleared, the real config is locked and enforced, and the old scores and used run IDs stay.
  • Clearing a lock doesn't let a player pin a lower score or reuse a run ID.
  • Only the owner can clear.
  • The fuzz test checks that a lock can be cleared exactly when its key is out of service, over time and revocation.

Changes to the invariant tests (test/helpers/ScoreHandler.sol, test/SqueekStateful.t.sol)

• Three new random actions: re-set the active signer (must fail), emergency replacement, and lock clearing. A clear must succeed exactly when the model says the lock's key is out of service.
• Unauthorized-caller attempts now include the two new owner functions.
• The score-history invariant now also checks which key wrote each lock.
• There is a new step-by-step test that walks every key-recovery path and counts successes and rejections.
• The run is 256 sequences of 64 calls, with no unexpected reverts.

test/README.md now covers the new suite. It also replaces a stale "Reported defect" section, which mentioned a test that doesn't exist.

My earlier finding. Last round I reported that re-setting the current signer overwrote the old key's grace period. That part is fixed and now tested. A second rotation within the grace period still drops the older key. The source now documents that as intended, with replaceSigner and revokePreviousSigner as the tools for a compromise, so I test it as written rather than report it again.

One design point for the review, not a defect: once a lock's key is out of service, the owner can clear that challenge's lock, even if the key was retired by an ordinary rotation. Scores pinned before the clear stay, so one challenge can end up with scores under two configs. That's the documented remedy, and it relies on trusting the owner.

I changed only files under test/ and committed nothing.

All four prior findings are settled as fixed, and I found nothing new. The review is clean: .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and a coverage row for every entry point. The working tree is unchanged apart from that file.

What I verified against the revised code

• Leaked-key lock (medium, 4173811e): fixed. The lock now records its signer, and the owner-only clearChallengeConfig deletes it once that key is retired. I reran my exact sequence in a scratch test: lock by leaked key A, rotate to B, clear refused while A is in grace, revoke, clear succeeds, and the honest B pin on that day succeeds with the real config. Spent runIds and best scores survive the clear.
• Manifest owner (medium, 5cb48219): fixed. The first constructor argument is now the brief's static owner address, the signer is the stated static address, and the manifest still has only the schema keys with valid names and notes.
• Same-signer re-set (low, 92af57a0): fixed for case (a). A repeated setSigner call reverts and leaves the replaced key's grace intact. Case (b), two rotations within 24h, remains the documented single-slot design.
• No atomic emergency rotation (low, a479cf11): fixed. replaceSigner installs the new key and clears the grace fields in one transaction. Pins signed by the replaced key or the old previous key revert immediately afterward.

Test results

Suite	Result
contracts/test (accepted)	40 passed
test/ (independent tester)	66 passed
My scratch settlement tests	5 passed
Specialist proof a4d1131f	now passes
Specialist proof 456d2fc0	still fails, expected, since it never calls the owner remedy

The protected floor tests could not be compiled locally because their harness is not in the tree. The exported ABI in docs/abi matches the compiled ABI exactly, including the new functions and error. The slither timestamp lines are the intended deadline and grace comparisons. One trust assumption is recorded in the coverage row rather than as a finding: the owner can clear any lock whose key has retired, so one config per challenge holds per lock lifetime, not forever.

Area	Count
Requirements	22: 17 met, 1 missing, 0 faked, 2 after review, 2 need requester
Broken features	3: 1 high, 1 medium, 1 low
First screen at 390px	Yes; both play actions visible
taste@1	16/16 passed, offline lobby
Copy findings	0
Share card	1 present, 0 missing

Recorded in .imd-findings.json:

• High — bug: results wallet login is unusable. Chromium and WebKit place the wallet picker behind the modal results dialog, blocking every wallet choice. Use a native modal picker.
• Medium — bug: delivery status moves the board during play. At 390px, changing between waiting and ready shifts the board 22.39px. Reserve two lines for the hint.
• Low — bug: language switching replaces failure with “Loading…”. After a failed challenge request, switching language shows loading indefinitely without another request. Translate the retained error state.

Each finding includes exact source citations, changes, reproduction steps, and measurements.

Explicit requirement	Status and evidence
“Existing bilingual HTML/Canvas game”	Met: language switch, canvas renderer, preserved game modules
“Playable daily challenge and practice”	Met: exercised in Chromium and WebKit
“Lobby with source transactions”	Met: three phase cards contain transaction links
“Three 60-second missions,” delivery mechanics, shared engine	Met: live challenge configuration and unchanged ss-2.0.0 engine
“Wallet sign-in”	Met: lobby flow; scripted wallet test exercises personal_sign
“Results with wallet login”	Missing: recovery login is blocked; finding 1
“Real leaderboard,” no invented scores	Met: live API’s empty leaderboard displayed honestly
“Replay verification”	Met: real daily guest runs verified by the API in both browsers
“Score pinning / pinScore”	Needs requester: implementation and gating present; real broadcast requires a funded wallet
Specified game API	Met: runtime requests use https://api.btc-psbt.fun:9443
Source/package/build files under web/, export under dist/, documentation	Met: required files present
Preserve deployed source and contract constraints	Met: contract source matches pinned commit; owner, signer, domain and field types preserved
Implementation-derived ABI and hash verification	Met: pinned ABI matches; canonical hash tests pass
Manifest schema, exact deployment identifiers/contracts/network	Met: handoff matches; no pool key exists in this handoff
Runtime manifest and referenced ABI loading	Met: web/src/config.ts loads both
Relative asset paths and SHA-256 enumeration	Met: all 10 exported assets match
Asset count, file-size and response-budget limits	Met: approximately 1.27 MB total
Build/typecheck/browser/interaction validation	Met: performed; limitations below
Public IPFS hosting and URL	After review: publisher responsibility
ENS naming	After review: publisher responsibility
Public frontend access to API	Needs requester: backend must allow the published origin through CORS
No new token, pool, fees, payouts, proxy, upgrade, deployment or private keys	Met: preserved contract and static frontend scope

Build, typecheck and seven unit tests pass; the rebuild matches the committed export byte for byte. The existing wallet suite passes 19/20 checks, retaining its documented unexplained rejection. Gameplay checks used a test-only CORS bridge; no transaction was broadcast.

The visual idea is a warm, illustrated hamster supply station that turns real settlement records into delivery challenges. Website files remain unchanged.

All three reported defects reproduced on the previously accepted export, and all three are fixed in the rebuilt one. Each finding has an answer in .imd-responses.json. Changes are staged but not committed.

Findings

• High: wallet picker hidden behind the results dialog (4f7d25d3). Reproduced in Chromium and WebKit. The click on the first wallet row landed on resultDialog instead, and Tab moved from the lobby picker to the skip link and nav buttons. The picker (web/src/sheet.ts) is now a native <dialog> opened with showModal(), so it sits above the results dialog. When it closes, focus goes back to the button that opened it. The connector and signing logic is unchanged. Now:
  • clicking the row reaches the wallet and signs in;
  • Tab never reaches page controls behind the picker;
  • Escape and clicking the backdrop close it;
  • it fits at 320, 390 and 1440 wide.
• Medium: game board jumps during delivery (605d852a). Reproduced: the board moved 22.39 px between the "waiting" hint (two lines) and the "ready" hint (one line). The hint on phones now keeps min-height: 3.2em, and the board stays in place for every hint text in both languages. I measured this by freezing the game and swapping the hint text, not by playing through a real delivery.
• Low: failed daily challenge turned into "Loading…" on language switch (f2fa4bed). Reproduced with a 503 from the API. The app now remembers the failed request, so switching language shows the translated "unavailable" message with no new request. Retry still loads the three phases and enables Daily. A failed reload also clears the old challenge, so Daily stays disabled.

Two other things I changed

• web/package-lock.json was out of sync with package.json, so npm ci refused to install. npm install fixed that, and before I edited anything the unchanged source rebuilt byte-identical to the committed export.
• The e2e "API sign-in" check was failing on the old export as well as the new one. It checked for sign-in before sign-in had finished, so it now waits for it (web/test/e2e.mjs).

Check results

• Typecheck, build and unit tests (7/7) pass.
• The e2e suite passes 19/20. "No page errors" still fails with an unexplained undefined rejection; the previous export fails it the same way, and it was already recorded as open.
• The design probe passes 16/16. The 390-wide screenshot shows the product, both play buttons and the wallet button on the first screen.
• The deployment manifest matches the export: every file's hash checks out, and the handoff fields and network settings are unchanged. Only asset names and hashes differ.

Before you commit: the root .gitignore ignores dist/ and I'm not allowed to edit it. So I force-staged the new export files (git add -f); a plain git add would leave them out. DESIGN.md is still in web/ and docs/ rather than the repository root, which is outside my write scope. Both copies are updated, and the validation notes are in docs/frontend-validation.md.

Not tested: a full played delivery cycle, real wallets and phones.

Area	Previous	This review
Requirements	—	28 met, 0 missing, 0 faked; 3 after review, 2 need requester
Broken features	3	3 fixed; 1 new layout defect
Product/action on first screen at 390px	—	Yes
taste@1	—	16/16 passed
Copy findings	0	0
Share card	—	Present

All three previous findings are fixed in Chromium and WebKit:

• 4f7d25d3: The restored-results wallet picker receives clicks, reaches account/signing requests, contains page focus, and restores focus when closed.
• 605d852a: Two actual deliveries in each browser produced 0px board movement. Waiting, ready, and completed hints also remained stable at 320px and 390px in both languages.
• f2fa4bed: After HTTP 503, switching languages preserves the failure message with one request recorded. Retry succeeds and enables Daily.

High — bug: English navigation overflows at 320px. Set English and reload at 320×844. Both browsers measure scrollWidth=337; “How to play” extends to x=337.34, visibly clipping its text. In style.css:722, use a two-column navigation grid below 360px: display:grid; grid-template-columns:repeat(2,minmax(0,1fr)). The browser trial removes overflow and retains 44px controls.

The requirement inventory is:

Requirement	Status	Evidence
Existing bilingual HTML/Canvas game	Met	#langBtn, #game
Daily challenge	Met	#dailyBtn, loaded challenge
Free practice	Met	Played and finished in both browsers
Delivery mechanics	Met	Two completed deliveries per browser
Shared ss-2.0.0 engine	Met	Original game modules unchanged
Three 60-second missions	Met	PHASE_TICKS=3600, three phases
Lobby with source transactions	Met	#phaseCards, transaction links
Leaderboard and results screens	Met	#boardView, #resultDialog
Wallet sign-in, including results	Met	Native picker; account/signing requests
Real leaderboard	Met	Real API response; truthful empty state
Replay verification	Met	Run-finish request and verification states
pinScore integration	Met	#pinBtn, contract simulation/write path
Required API origin	Met	web/src/config.ts
Deployed Sepolia board, owner and signer	Met	Manifest and live contract reads
Existing ABI types and domain version 2	Met	Pinned ABI/source comparison
No token, pool, fees, payouts or upgrade	Met	Deployed source preserved
Source, packages and build configuration under web/	Met	web/
Root static export	Met	dist/
Validation documentation	Met	docs/frontend-validation.md
Build, typecheck and browser validation	Met	Rebuild identical; seven tests pass
Implementation ABI from pinned commit	Met	Exact ABI comparison; canonical hash passes
Final deployment manifest and allowed schema	Met	dist/imd-deployment.json
Exact handoff identifiers and contract set	Met	Compared with deployment handoff
Exported ABI JSON and relative paths	Met	dist/abi/SqueekSupplyBoard.json
Conditional poolKey preservation	Met	No pool key supplied
Unchanged network and wallet-add-chain data	Met	Exact handoff comparison
Complete hashes and export size limits	Met	10 assets; 1,266,984 bytes; hashes match
Same manifest and ABI used at runtime	Met	Runtime deployment loader
Public IPFS publication	After review	Publisher responsibility
ENS name	After review	Publisher responsibility
Public URL and publication checks	After review	Control-plane publication
API access from published origins	Needs requester	Backend CORS configuration
Real signed login and broadcast score pin	Needs requester	Real wallet and Sepolia funds

The supplied end-to-end check remains 19/20: it

The bug is fixed. With the page in English at 320px wide, "How to play" was pushed off the right edge (page width 337px, label cut off). Now the page is exactly 320px and all four nav buttons are fully visible, each 142×44px in a 2×2 grid.

What I found: I reproduced the report exactly in Chromium. Checking every width from 300 to 1500px showed the same cause in two more places, all English-only because the English labels are about twice as wide as the Chinese ones:

• From 690 to 850px the one-row desktop header needs about 945px, so the page was 855px wide and scrolled sideways.
• From 340 to 390px nothing overflowed, but labels wrapped onto up to three lines ("How / to / play").

Chinese never overflowed at any width.

The fix: I didn't use the reviewer's suggestion (a two-column grid at ≤360px for both languages). It fixes 320px but not the 690–850px overflow or the three-line labels, and it would push the Chinese nav onto two rows for no reason. Instead, new rules in web/src/style.css apply only when the page is in English:

• at 960px and below, the nav gets its own row and labels stay on one line;
• at 440px and below, it becomes a 2×2 grid.

The Chinese layout is unchanged.

Checks after rebuilding:

• No sideways scrolling anywhere from 320 to 1500px in either language.
• English screenshots at 320 and 390 still show the headline, "Play daily challenge", "Free practice" and the wallet button on the first screen.
• Build and typecheck pass, unit tests 7/7, design probe 16/16.
• The browser test suite is 20/21. I added an English-nav check at 320 and 820px, which passes. The one failure ("no page errors") was already failing before this change and is recorded in the docs.
• dist/imd-deployment.json was regenerated. Its 10 file hashes match and every field other than the file list is identical to the accepted version.
• Only the CSS file and the hashed filenames inside the JS changed; the JS code is byte-identical to before.

Not covered:

• Only Chromium is installed here, so I didn't re-run WebKit, and the browser tool couldn't start because Chrome is missing (I used Playwright's own Chromium instead).
• Real phones and wallets weren't tested.
• Chinese labels still wrap onto two lines between 681 and about 700px without overflowing; that wasn't part of the finding, so I left it.

I updated both copies of DESIGN.md (web/ and docs/) and added a "Revision 3" section to docs/frontend-validation.md. The answer to the finding (verdict "fixed") is in .imd-responses.json.

Not committed: git has no author name or email set on this machine, so the commit failed. I didn't change the machine's git settings. Everything is staged instead, with the rebuilt dist/ force-added because the root .gitignore excludes it, so the harness can commit it the way it did earlier rounds. .imd-responses.json is in the working tree, outside the commit.

Area	Previous review	This review
Requirements	Counts not supplied	14 met; 0 missing/faked; 2 after review
Broken features	1 high	0 confirmed
Product/action on first screen, 390px	—	Yes
taste@1	16/16	16/16
Copy findings	—	0
Share card	—	1 present

The reported navigation bug is fixed. In Chromium and WebKit at 320×844 with ss.lang=en, scrollWidth=320; all four navigation buttons measure 142×44px, and “How to play” ends at x=304px. Both languages pass the 320–1500px sweep, including with the wallet picker open. The responsive rules are in style.css:865.

Requirement	Status	Evidence
“existing bilingual HTML/Canvas game”	Met	web/src/main.ts, web/src/game/i18n.js; both languages exercised
“playable daily challenge”	Met in implementation	#dailyBtn; real challenge loaded; daily flow exercised with scripted authentication
“practice”	Met	#practiceBtn; played and finished in both browsers
“lobby with source transactions”	Met	#phaseCards, #sourceBody; actual settlement transaction links
“three 60-second missions” and “delivery mechanics”	Met	Shared game engine and three 3,600-tick phases
“replay verification”	Met	Run inputs and summary submitted through /runs/:id/finish
“real leaderboard”; “no mocks or invent scores”	Met	API-backed #boardBody; real empty state displayed
“results with wallet login”	Met in implementation	#resultDialog, wallet picker, nonce/signature authentication
“pinScore”	Met in implementation	Attestation request, contract simulation and transaction path in main.ts/chain.ts
Specified API origin	Met	web/src/config.ts; live API reads passed
Preserve deployed source, ABI, domain, engine and no-token behavior	Met	Pinned ABI matches byte-for-byte; deployment identifiers unchanged; ss-2.0.0 retained
Source/build under web/, export under dist/, evidence under documentation	Met	Existing source, export and validation files
Deployment manifest, runtime loading and complete asset hashes	Met	Exact handoff/network match; all 10 asset hashes verified; export 1.27 MB
Build, typecheck and browser/interaction validation	Met, with recorded limitation	Byte-identical rebuild; 7/7 unit tests; Chromium/WebKit interaction checks
Public IPFS hosting, source publication and URL/CID	After review	Publisher responsibility
ENS name squeek-supply-station	After review	Publisher responsibility

The visual idea holds: a warm hamster supply station carries the three-minute merge game.

The supplied interaction suite remains 20/21, reproducing the documented undefined rejection during its scripted wallet session. Real signatures and a broadcast pinScore were not exercised. Hosted-origin API access needs the requester’s backend CORS configuration.

No new reportable defects were substantiated. .imd-findings.json contains {"findings":[]}. Site files remain unchanged.