Implemented the complete Cadence Foundry project:

• Fixed-supply Cadence ERC-20: 1 billion CDNC, 18 decimals, no admin or mint backdoor.
• SubscriptionRegistry with:
  • 10 CDNC fixed price per 30-day period
  • Multi-period prepayment
  • One-time, first-caller beneficiary selection
  • Direct, non-refundable beneficiary payments
  • Expiry tracking and isActive
  • Checks-effects-interactions and reentrancy protection
• 14 success and failure tests, including timing boundaries, failed payments, insufficient allowance, invalid configuration, and malicious-token reentrancy.
• Exact generated ABIs under docs/abi/.
• Deployment assumptions, launch race risk, parameters, and operational responsibilities documented in README.md.

Validation passed:

• forge build
• forge test — 14 passed, 0 failed
• forge fmt --check
• ABI exports exactly match compiler output
• git diff --check

Wrote {"findings":[]} to .imd-findings.json. No substantiated defects found in the contracts, tests, or ABI exports.

launch.json was absent and remains unreviewed. Existing files were unchanged; tests were inspected, not rerun.

launch.json is written and validated. Summary:

• kind evm_project; token Cadence / "Cadence" / "CDNC" / 18 decimals — matches src/Cadence.sol:6-10 and its zero-argument constructor.
• contracts: single entry SubscriptionRegistry with ["$token"], matching constructor(address token_) at src/SubscriptionRegistry.sol:38 and docs/abi/SubscriptionRegistry.json. It's the only application contract in the accepted tree, so no $contract references and no ordering ambiguity. The registry has no owner/admin parameter, so no $owner and no wallet is named.
• pool: native ETH (zero address), fee 3000, tickSpacing 60, initialPrice "79228162514264337593543950336" (1:1 sqrtPriceX96), no hook.
• notes (2667 chars) record why price/period are source constants, that the beneficiary is first-caller-wins and therefore an operator step with no manifest field, and what belongs to policy/attestation rather than the manifest.

Checks run: a schema check in test/scratch/ (all schema fields, identifier/uniqueness/reserved-name rules, reference direction, address-typed reference placement, notes length) cross-referenced against the exported ABIs — passes; forge build and forge test on the accepted tree pass (14 tests, 0 failures). git status shows launch.json as the only change.

One thing worth flagging to the review node, not a manifest defect: the permanent beneficiary can be claimed by anyone between deployment and the operator's setBeneficiary call. The constructor cannot preset it under the approved one-argument constraint, so the risk lives in the deployment runbook (README.md), which already documents it.

Review complete. No files in the accepted tree were changed — git diff HEAD is empty, and forge build / forge test (14 passed) / forge fmt --check still pass. Findings are in .imd-findings.json.

What I verified

Everything below I checked directly, mostly by building an adversarial Foundry harness outside the repo (symlinked lib/, copied src/) so the tree stayed untouched.

Clean, and worth recording as such:

• docs/abi/Cadence.json and docs/abi/SubscriptionRegistry.json are byte-for-byte identical to the compiled ABIs (normalized JSON compare against out/).
• launch.json validates against the canonical LaunchManifest schema: all five required keys, no extras, notes 2667/4000 chars, contract name 20/32 chars, $token fills the one address-typed constructor slot, pool fields exactly the Sepolia values, initialPrice a valid decimal sqrtPriceX96 < 2^256. Token has no constructor args; MerkleDistributor not used.
• The registry constructor never touches msg.sender — it avoids the documented factory-ownership trap outright.
• Runtime opcode scan with the floor's own PUSH-skipping algorithm: no DELEGATECALL/CALLCODE/SELFDESTRUCT in either contract (1240 and 1259 bytes, far under EIP-170). No selector collision between Cadence and the ten admin signatures the token floor probes. Supply is exactly 10^27 to the deployer, no second mint path.
• Checks-effects-interactions and the reentrancy guard hold; the malicious-token test genuinely exercises the guard. Token self-transfer accounting is correct (from == to nets to zero, not to a doubled balance).

Findings, ranked:

1. medium — setBeneficiary is permissionless and one-shot (the approved design), but no actor in the stage plan is assigned to win that race. The factory makes no init calls, the manifest has no field for it, contributors can't broadcast. Reproduced: 0xBAD claims it, the operator's call reverts BeneficiaryAlreadySet forever, and alice's subscribe(1) pays 0xBAD 10 CDNC. Permanent, no recovery. I did not mark this high: the code matches the brief exactly, so resolving it is a scope decision (authorized post-deploy step with evidence, or amend the brief to bind the beneficiary at construction), not a patch to send back.
2. low — periods > type(uint256).max / PERIOD guards the wrong product. subscribe(type(uint256).max / 1e19 + 1) returns Panic(0x11), not the InvalidPeriods the ABI and README advertise. Fails closed, but the next-stage web client will decode it as an unknown error.
3. low — README:33 says the repo "intentionally does not include launch.json"; commit b3b4818 added it. The manifest node's write scope couldn't fix the README. Same section names no protected-suite env vars.
4. low — CDNC transferred directly to the registry is unrecoverable (no outbound transfer path at all) and undocumented. Adding a rescue would violate the no-admin requirement, so the fix is documentation.
5. low — coverage: zero vm.expectEmit in the suite, so all four non-indexed Subscribed fields are unasserted; the insufficient-balance path is shadowed by the allowance check in the one test that looks like it covers it. I confirmed both behave correctly today — this is regression exposure, not a live bug.
6. info — the beneficiary subscribes for free (self-transfer nets zero). Economically neutral since it receives all revenue, but it's an undocumented privileged capability.
7. info — lib/forge-std is a 44-line hand-written stub. Sufficient to compile both protected floors, but it rules out fuzzing, bound, deal, assertLt and log_* — which is why the suite is fourteen fixed-input tests and why finding #2 survived. Out of everyone's write scope; recorded so admission doesn't over-read the green suite.

Implemented the complete Cadence frontend and committed-ready static export.

Key deliverables:

• React/Vite/TypeScript source under web
• Static relative-base export under dist
• Runtime deployment manifest at imd-deployment.json
• Setup and rebuild documentation in frontend.md
• Validation evidence in validation.md

Validation completed:

• Strict typecheck passed.
• Production build passed.
• 7 interaction/configuration tests passed.
• Both canonical ABI hashes match the deployment handoff.
• Sepolia chain ID and nonempty deployed bytecode verified.
• Static preview returned HTTP 200 for the app, manifest, and both ABIs.
• Manifest audit passed for all 74 exported assets.
• Export size is approximately 2.4 MB; complete deliverable is approximately 2.75 MB.
• No out-of-scope files were modified and dependency directories are ignored.

No live wallet transaction was broadcast, and graphical browser screenshot testing was unavailable; both limitations are documented.