The work is complete and verified. Here is the summary.

Outcome. The project at commit 15100e6 is already launchable as the brief's v3.16 L1, so no source file changed. Both creation-code hashes built from the unchanged foundry.toml match the brief exactly, from the repository build and the launch-toolchain build alike.

Launch rules checked against the unchanged code. Both constructors are nonpayable, take only static words, make no external calls, and neither contract has an owner. The binder is a static word holding the brief's project wallet, and bind refuses every other caller including the factory. No IMD protocol address appears among the words. Neither runtime contains DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT, and no library function is external.

Imported audit. All three findings reproduce against the unchanged source, in the exact L1-to-L3 state (Desk bound by the binder to a pinned-code registry with only RewardPool registered). None is fixed in source, because the brief pins the Desk's creation hash and says no source changes. Each is handled operationally instead:

• Low, stream-0 backup lost before FarmRewards is registered. Reproduced: the backup pays 0.5 IMD, then delivery and relay both revert with NotConfigured. The keeper's ask-backup already refuses until all fourteen roles are registered, and the README now says no other tool may buy one in that window.
• Info, phantom pending record after a relayed copy. Reproduced; clears with clearExpired after the one-hour deadline. Documented.
• Info, AnswerIgnored emittable without a signature. Reproduced; the keeper already keys on AnswerStored only. Documented.

Files delivered.

• test/LaunchV316L1.t.sol pins both hashes, checks the eight words, deploys both contracts from the factory address on an empty chain at chain id 4663 with the escrow's word resolved to index 0, and scans the runtimes.
• test/AuditV316L1.t.sol reproduces the three findings in five tests.
• keeper/README.md gains the operational notes above.
• ADAPTATION.md records every change, each rule checked, and each finding's handling.

Checks run. The full forge test suite passes with the new tests added (306 passed, 6 pre-existing skipped fork tests). The protected harness as supplied passed with the exact words and CREATE2 predictions. Both pin tools, the deploy gate on the JSON plan, and the node keeper tests all pass. No launch.json was written, and nothing was deployed or signed. The L2 launch number for bind and wiring.tokenLaunch comes from the later L2 launch.

Created launch.json with SwarmDesk at index 0 and EndowmentEscrow at index 1 in one launch, using the exact approved arguments and keeper handoff notes.

Validation passed: manifest checks, both creation hashes, forge build, and forge test (306 passed, 6 skipped). Only launch.json changed.

Confirmed addresses and the launch number remain deployment outputs.

Review complete. The findings file is written and validated; the working tree has no stray files.

Outcome: no reproducible permission defect found. The file .imd-findings.json holds an empty findings list and a coverage record answering all 156 listed entry points plus three invariant rows, every name matched exactly against the verifier's list.

What I checked in my area (Access Control, Trust Gap, Asymmetry)

• SwarmDesk.bind is binder-only, one-shot, and every v3.15 proof still runs for the binder: pinned registry and Params code, factory CREATE2 predictions, gameConfigHash, Params pointing back to the Desk, the hook's self-report, and the LaunchFactory record for the supplied L2 launch number. The binder can choose among proven registries but cannot skip a proof, which matches the accepted M-2 and binder-liveness lines.
• The Desk's oracle surface (onOracleResult, submit, onOracleFailure, clearExpired, askBackup, execute) has consistent replay keys on both the intake and relay paths, one accepted answer per slot, and every swarm action clamped on-chain. I checked that no non-try call inside execute can revert on a reachable state (Params step and cooldown mirror the Params checks, feature indices stay in range), and that EIP-150 gas forwarding rules out a selective out-of-gas grief against the try/catch blocks.
• EndowmentEscrow.forward pays only the bound registry's pinned RewardPool, once, and the escrow already holds the whole L2 remainder before any bind is possible, so a partial-balance pre-fire is not reachable.
• Every module gates its privileged entry points on registry.module(role) or Params.swarmWallet, and FarmItems is soulbound through its transfer hook. I found no storage written by two differently guarded paths, no admin variant missing a user-side check, and no admin setter that redirects in-flight value.
• L1 constructor inputs: both creation hashes match the compiled artifacts, the policy word decodes to chain 1, the stated block window, 0.5 IMD max price and 200 bps heartbeat with reserved bits zero, and the binder equals the FeeRouter team constant rather than any protocol address.

Not reached: no part of the assigned area was left unverified. I did not re-derive the economic envelope math in FarmRewards or the V4 hook pricing beyond their access and pairing checks, since those belong to the other specialists.

Done. Two new test files were added under test/, both passing, and the full suite passes with them.

Result

What was added

• test/L1V316Edges.t.sol covers the failure paths of the two L1 contracts. For SwarmDesk: every degenerate constructor word one at a time (zero action, zero chain, zero max price, inverted block window, zero or equal questions, zero bodies, zero config hash, zero binder), fuzzed reserved policy bits, a fuzzed heartbeat band closed at 200 and 5000, and a fuzzed non-zero binder. For bind: a fuzzed non-binder is refused with Unauthorized before any argument is read, fuzzed zero launches and index overflow give InvalidValue, an echo market that returns desk(), token() and gameConfigHash() is refused against four concrete LaunchFactory records (unrecorded, genuine hook, non-ETH pair, other token), and misconfigured registries (Params naming another Desk, wrong endowment, hook built for another Desk, codeless candidate, swapped indices) are refused by the binder itself. Success records the coordinates and tokenLaunch, then AlreadyDone for the binder and still Unauthorized for others.
• The same file covers EndowmentEscrow: constructor refuses zero and the factory address, forward is refused while the Desk is unbound, index and launch bounds, a wrong pool pin, an unregistered pool waits with NotConfigured, a failing transfer rolls back without flipping forwarded, a reentering token is stopped, fuzzed callers and amounts move the whole balance once down to one wei, an empty escrow keeps its exit, and there is no other function or ETH path.
• test/L1V316Invariants.t.sol runs two handlers over random call sequences. The escrow handler deposits, forwards with right and wrong proofs, and binds from anyone. Invariants: escrow balance equals deposits minus forwarded, pool holds exactly what was forwarded, at most one exit that never reopens, and a forward implies the binder bound this registry. The Desk handler donates IMD, buys backups with right and wrong bodies on both streams, reports intake failures, spoofs failures, clears expiries, rebinds, submits and executes garbage, and moves time. Invariants: Desk balance equals seed plus donations minus paid backups, intake holds every paid backup, one backup per stream and slot, and registry, tokenLaunch, binder and coordinates never change. A scratch check confirmed both handlers actually reach paid backups and a forward, so the invariants are not vacuous.

Observations, not defects

• Tokens that reach the escrow after its one forward have no exit. The contract documents this as its design, and the fuzz test records the behaviour rather than hiding it.
• Fork runs against live Robinhood Chain state are still owed, as before: the LaunchFactory record and the real ProjectFactory prediction are reproduced by the local stand-ins in script/Deploy.s.sol.

The two files are left uncommitted in the working tree under test/, the only path this task may write.

The findings file is written and validated: one medium finding with a failing Foundry proof, plus 156 coverage rows (all listed entry points).

Outcome

• One medium finding at src/FarmRewards.sol:424. The farm's price basis is taken from the single most recently settled epoch's net yield. One zero-yield epoch (all installed items below 20% durability, a Fire epoch with no cooling, a city-wide Outage, or a Router-only loadout under Theft) writes zero, and Economy.farmDaily falls to the global 3000-token floor. Rooms, inventory expansions, cable repair, lobby and the lock minimum for the 20% mining boost are then priced off that floor until the next non-zero settlement. The reset is self-triggerable by swapping in one worn item for an epoch. In the reproduction the basis drops from 26,180,000 to 3,000 tokens and room 3 costs 30,000 instead of 261,800,000 tokens. The proof in test/scratch/FarmDailyFloor.t.sol fails on this code at the farmDaily assertion.

What held in the Math Precision, Boundary and Numerical Gap passes

• Reward envelope: productive hash is bounded at 1.4375x committed weight (set cap, 15% Festival, 25% district boost, symmetric lock boost) against the 1.5x allocation, so the spent > allocation revert that would lock a farm's cursor is unreachable. The budget reservation (1.59x mining) covers maximum allocation plus prize, so the dust recycle cannot underflow.
• Weight and expiry buckets, vintage ring eviction (32 epochs is always past the 7-day tax window), tax decay, scrap allowance, and reserved accounting stay consistent.
• FeeRouter splits (team, pot, heartbeat with the unchangeable 1 ETH cap, rewards) never underflow. V4Market TWAP has no zero divisor or overflow for prices in the accepted bounds, the 32-slot ring always covers the 30-minute window, and sell fee, deviation and imbalance math are bounded. Season pot shares sum to 100% and the district split divisor is at least one whenever a claimant qualifies. SwarmDesk clamps keep Params.set from reverting. The SwarmDesk and EndowmentEscrow creation hashes match the launch brief.

Not reached in depth: oracle signature verification in src/oracle/, src/lib/Robinhood.sol constants, and the trust/access dimensions outside the math area. Coverage rows for those entry points record what the math pass found.

The review is complete and the findings file is in place at the repository root. No tracked file was changed.

Result: no reproducible defect in the assigned area. The file holds an empty findings list and a 160-row coverage record (156 entry points plus 4 invariant rows).

What I covered in depth (Execution Trace, Periphery, First Principles guides, after the Senior Auditor's Mindset):

• SwarmDesk: constructor word decoding (policy word unpacks to chain 1, blocks 26122900–26122901, max price 0.5 IMD, 200 bps), the binder-only one-shot bind with its CREATE2, Params back-pointer, hook-echo and positionOf proofs, askBackup spend bounds and approval reset, both _accept paths (replay keys, context window, canonical 288/608-byte encoding, slot and epoch equality, signature ordering), execute into GridOperator, Params, Civic, Enhancement and PackSale. Every Desk-side clamp matches the downstream guard, so no third party can make a stored answer unexecutable, and the epoch-drift early return is unreachable inside the 6-hour validity.
• EndowmentEscrow: single exit, proofs tied to the Desk's bound registry and the pinned RewardPool code.
• Periphery: Robinhood, SwarmCode, ModuleCode, ChainClock (its 256-block window matches ArbSys exactly), GameModule, OracleAttestation and the signature shim, SwarmArgs, MarketFactory's salt assembly, Billboards, StarterClaim, StandardAdapter.

Evidence run locally: the build with the unchanged foundry.toml, the L1 rehearsal test (creation hashes match the brief, eight static words with no protocol address, empty-chain deploy), and 35 Desk/escrow/binding/oracle tests, all passing. The v3.16 fork rehearsal log confirms bind, positionOf, forward and fundEndowment ran against the real 4663 contracts.

Not reached: 85 entry points in FarmCore, FarmEngine, FarmItems, FarmRewards, FeeRouter, Season, Economy and most of PackSale. They are recorded as unreached so the judge can see where coverage stops.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. No source files were changed, and the scratch tests were removed.

Findings in .imd-findings.json

1. Medium. Farm-size price basis is a one-epoch self-report. Economy.farmDaily is max(3000, lastFarmDaily), and FarmRewards overwrites lastFarmDaily with a single epoch's net yield at every settlement (src/FarmRewards.sol:424). A large farm unplaces everything but one Common item for one epoch, settles, re-places its full loadout, and then buys rooms, expansions, locks or lobby entries at the 3,000-token floor. In the reproduction the honest room-1 price was about 3.06M tokens and the manipulated price was about 10k, a 300x reduction, at the cost of one epoch of the farm's own mining. The RewardPool loses the sink inflow that funds every other player's emission. I verified this with a scratch test on the BaseTest fixture.

2. Low. Economy.lock insertion bound is a cheap district-wide griefing vector. The 32-step walk in _insert (src/Economy.sol:178) rejects any lock not larger than 33 existing locks in the district. 33 fresh wallets each locking the 15,000-token minimum for 7 days (495k tokens, fully refundable) make every minimum-sized lock in that district revert. Verified with a scratch test.

Coverage. All 156 listed entry points have a row. 152 are holds, 4 are finding. None are unreached. Key invariants I traced and found intact: the 159% budget reservation versus the 150% productive envelope (max Festival x district boost is 1.4375), reserved-versus-pending conservation through claim, spend, scrap, prize and dust recycling, Season pot percentages summing to 100% with rollover only into the still-open week, FeeRouter ETH stream splits with the fixed 1 ETH heartbeat cap, pre-endowment inflow bookkeeping in RewardPool, and the escrow, Desk and hook binding proofs.

Not done. Neither finding carries a self-contained proof file. The medium finding does not require one under the task rules, and building a fixture-free deployment would not have fit the remaining time. The reproduction steps in the file are exact enough to replay on the existing BaseTest fixture.

The review is written to .imd-findings.json and validated. Nothing else is pending.

Outcome. Two findings kept, both reproduced; nothing blocks the L1 deployment itself.

• Finding 1, medium, merged. The audit_economics and audit_math mediums are one root cause at src/FarmRewards.sol:424. One zero-net settlement overwrites the farm's price basis, so every farm-scaled price drops to the 3,000-token floor. The attached proof fails on this tree exactly as stated. Fixing it changes the FarmRewards creation-code pin, which is the author's call.
• Finding 2, low. Thirty-three equal locks in a district make Economy.lock revert for every smaller lock. I wrote and ran a scratch test confirming the revert and the one-wei escape.

L1 checks that hold. The SwarmDesk and EndowmentEscrow creation hashes match the task's expected values. The policy word decodes to valid fields with the top bits zero. Both constructors make no external calls, the Desk runtime is under the EIP-170 limit, and no protocol address appears in the manifest. All 67 tests in the L1 suites pass, and I traced every SwarmDesk and escrow entry point including the regulator path's non-try calls, which cannot revert because of the Desk's own clamps.

Coverage. All 156 rows are present. 66 hold, 6 carry a finding reference, and 84 are honestly marked unreached: PackSale, Civic, FarmCore, FarmRewards, Season, FarmEngine and the two markets were not traced within the budget beyond the entry points finding 1 touches.

The revision is complete. The medium finding reproduced and is fixed; the advisory low is answered as disputed with a reproduction; the full suite, the reviewer's proof, the pin checks, the deploy-gate tool and the protected harness all pass.

What I found. The reviewer's proof failed on the starting tree exactly as reported: one zero-net epoch set lastFarmDaily to zero, so every farm-scaled quote dropped to the 3000-token floor. The root cause was FarmRewards._reward overwriting the basis with a single epoch's net yield.

What I changed.

• src/FarmRewards.sol: the basis is now sticky. A higher settled yield still becomes the basis at once. A lower one only decays the previous basis by 1/96 per settled epoch, so starving a farm for n epochs forfeits n/4 days of yield to cut a price by at most n/96 of itself, which never pays for any multiplier up to 24 yield days. A pro-rata entry epoch is scaled to its full-epoch equivalent, as the reviewer also suggested.
• Pins regenerated with the project's own tools. FarmRewards sits in ModuleCode, which GameRegistry compiles in, which SwarmCode pins into both L1 contracts. Only the role-1 and registry pins moved.
• Hash references updated in the launch test, the plan JSON and the runbook. The flattened hook file was regenerated.
• New test/FarmDailyBasisV317.t.sol with five tests covering the exact decay step, geometric decay over eight starved epochs, immediate rise to a higher yield, and pro-rata entry scaling.
• ADAPTATION.md rewritten for the revision; .imd-responses.json answers both findings.

The important consequence for the manifest step. The SwarmDesk and EndowmentEscrow source, words and runtimes are byte-identical, but their compiled-in registry pin changed, so the creation hashes the brief quoted no longer apply:

The L2 hook and the L3 registry and FarmRewards hashes also moved; all are listed in ADAPTATION.md.

The advisory low on the 32-step lock insertion bound reproduces as described, but I left it alone. It is the documented design, no funds are at risk, the victim escapes by locking one wei more, and both suggested fixes change behaviour the brief did not ask for.

Verification. forge test: 313 passed, 0 failed, 6 pre-existing fork skips. The protected harness passed with the new init codes on chain id 4663.

The protected rehearsal passes against the manifest's exact init code, and the only changed file is launch.json. The work is complete.

Outcome: launch.json is verified and kept as accepted, with one sentence added to its notes. No other file changed.

What was verified

• The manifest has exactly the keys kind, contracts and notes. Notes are 2028 characters.
• SwarmDesk takes the eight static words from the brief in declaration order, matching its constructor ABI (bytes32, uint256, five bytes32, address). EndowmentEscrow takes one address, filled by the reference to SwarmDesk from the same launch. No IMD protocol address appears as a constructor word.
• forge build succeeds with the unchanged foundry.toml. forge test passes all 311 tests with 6 skipped.
• The protected deployment rehearsal passed when fed the manifest's init code for both contracts at chain id 4663: both constructors run on an empty chain, runtimes fit EIP-170, and no forbidden opcodes are present.

One discrepancy to flag for the attestation step. The brief's creation hashes belong to commit 15100e6, which I rebuilt in scratch and which reproduces them exactly. The working tree I was given is that commit plus other contributors' accepted work: a FarmRewards fix and regenerated SwarmCode and ModuleCode pins. That tree builds SwarmDesk and EndowmentEscrow to different creation hashes, as the ADAPTATION.md table already records. Contract names, constructor words and runtimes are identical in both trees, so the manifest is correct for either. I added one sentence to the notes stating this so the reviewer and the attestation, which binds the hashes of the tree it publishes, are not surprised.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. Nothing else is pending.

Outcome. The medium finding from round 1 is fixed. The low is reproducible but accepted by the author, and I concur. One info note records the creation-hash drift the fix caused. No new defects were found. The working tree is unchanged apart from the findings file.

Round-1 medium, farmDaily floor reset (e11b8d0f): fixed.

• Both attached proofs, copied under test/scratch, now pass against the revised code. The basis moves from 23.8M to 23.37M tokens after the engineered zero-net epoch instead of collapsing to 3000.
• I read the changed lines in FarmRewards as new code. The sticky basis cannot underflow, the pro-rata scaling cannot divide by zero because beginMining rejects a zero remaining-time weight, and the scaled value equals the farm's full-epoch rate rather than inflating it.
• The author's new test file passes, and the full suite passes with 340 tests and no failures.

Round-1 low, Economy lock insertion bound (3f205e97): kept at low, accepted.

• I re-ran the reproduction on this tree in a fresh scratch test and it still holds.
• The author's objection to my suggested tail-insertion fix is correct, since it would break the descending order the district stake prefix relies on. The dispute is settled as a documented operational risk recorded in ADAPTATION.md, and it does not block the launch.

Info note, L1 creation hashes. The FarmRewards fix moved the registry pin compiled into SwarmDesk and EndowmentEscrow, so the brief's two expected hashes no longer match what the tree builds. I verified the new pins equal the compiled creation code for FarmRewards, GameRegistry and Params. Constructor words are unchanged. The manifest and attestation step must publish this tree and record the new hashes.

Coverage. All 156 entry points are answered, with one marked finding and the rest holds. The only source changes since round 1 are the FarmRewards basis and the two regenerated pin libraries, both traced this round; everything else is unchanged from my round-1 trace and covered by the passing suite.