Implemented OWLN, BuyOnlyWindowHook, vendored dependencies, ABI exports, documentation, and factory-style launch tests.

Validation passed: forge build, forge fmt --check, 29 project tests, and 9 supplied protected checks. Project tests also pass with an empty environment and four threads.

The workflow omitted a numeric manifest price; the documented rehearsal assumes 1,000,000 OWLN per ETH and needs reconciliation with the final manifest.

Created launch.json with matching permissions, the approved constructor argument, and the existing rehearsal price.

Validation passed; notes are 1,873/4,000 characters. forge build and all 29 tests passed. Only launch.json is changed outside permitted scratch outputs.

I found no high or medium defects in BuyOnlyWindowHook or OWLN. I found two lower-severity ways to sell during the window, both allowed by the approved design, and wrote them to .imd-findings.json. It's the only file I wrote; it's ignored by git, so git status is clean. The existing suite passes (29/29). I ran the proof-of-concept tests in a scratch copy outside the repo and then deleted it.

Findings, most severe first:

1. Low – selling through a liquidity position during the window. A holder can get from OWLN to ETH before opensAt without making a sell swap:

   1. Buy 1 ETH of OWLN.
   2. Add OWLN-only liquidity at ticks [floor(tick/60)*60 − 600, floor(tick/60)*60], which is just below the current price. This deposits 874,177 OWLN and no ETH.
   3. Wait for another user to buy 50 ETH worth.
   4. Remove the position. The holder gets back 0.929 ETH and 0 OWLN, while sellsOpen is still false.

   This works because the spec requires "no liquidity callbacks; LPs can add and remove at any time." Blocking it would mean changing that agreed design, so it's a scope decision, not a code fix. What's missing is disclosure: the README and site should say only swaps are blocked, not every way out.

2. Info – WETH or other non-ETH pools on the same hook are never gated. This matches the spec, and the README already mentions it. The existing test test_nonEthPoolHasNoWindowNoEventAndTradesAllFourWays shows OWLN→WETH selling working during the window. It only works if someone supplies WETH to that pool.

What I checked and found no problem with:

• Exact-output swaps that pay out ETH: receiving ETH means swapping in the other direction (zeroForOne == false). That's blocked whether the amount is positive or negative (tested for both, plus fuzzing). An exact-output buy only ever returns OWLN.
• Other routers: the check ignores which router calls it and what extra data it sends, so any router or direct PoolManager call is blocked the same way (tested with a second router and spoofed data).
• A second ETH pool on the same hook: it starts its own 300-block window when it's created, so it opens later than the launch pool. The launch pool can't be initialized again (PoolAlreadyInitialized), so its window can't be restarted or changed.
• Can afterInitialize break the factory? It can only revert if the caller isn't the PoolManager. It has no checks on price, tick spacing, fee or token (fuzzed), and it does nothing that could fail. The factory's liquidity seed can't be blocked either, since there are no liquidity callbacks.
• Off-by-one at opensAt: a pool created at block N gets opensAt = N + 300. Sells revert in blocks N through N+299 (exactly 300 blocks) and succeed at N+300. The tests cover opensAt − 1 and exactly opensAt.
• Permanent lock: opensAt is always a fixed, finite block. There's no setter, admin or reset path, and swaps or liquidity changes don't move it (tested up to 10 million blocks later).
• Other checks:
  • The ABI files match forge inspect.
  • The manifest price equals 1000·2^96.
  • The constructor argument is the Sepolia PoolManager.
  • The permissions are exactly bits 0x1080.

Implemented source, static export, deployment manifest, and documentation.

Passed build/typecheck, 10 core tests, 12 browser scenarios, and live read-only swap simulation. No transactions broadcast. Complete delivery: 5.12 MB.

Commit aedf69d is in submission.bundle, since workspace .git is read-only.

Validation records the requirement conflicts: UniversalRouter follows the supplied network rule; design documentation is in docs/DESIGN.md because root writes are prohibited.