Implemented Runner (RUNNER): 1 billion tokens, 18 decimals, minted once to the deployer. No admin powers or additional minting.

Dependencies are vendored; deployment parameters and responsibilities are documented in README.md.

Passed forge build, forge test with the supplied seed, and forge fmt --check: 30 unit/fuzz tests plus both stateful invariants. Platform launch integration checks remain external.

Done. I wrote launch.json for the Runner (RUNNER) custom token launch and verified it against the accepted tree.

What the manifest says

• Token contract Runner, name Runner, symbol RUNNER, 18 decimals, empty constructorArgs. The accepted constructor takes no parameters, confirmed via the compiled ABI.
• totalSupply is the exact constructor mint, 10^27 minor units, matching the INITIAL_SUPPLY constant.
• contracts is empty. The accepted tree has only the token, so no application contracts are described.
• pool and economics are copied exactly as the launch gives them: IMD as paired currency, fee 12500, tick spacing 60, the one-to-one provenance price, and the requester's economics object verbatim.
• notes describe the token's behavior and the launch flows in under 1400 characters.

Checks run

• forge build compiled cleanly with solc 0.8.26.
• forge test with the pinned fuzz seed passed all 31 tests and both invariant suites with zero reverts.
• A schema check confirmed only the allowed top-level keys, string-typed uint256 and address fields, lowercase addresses, and a notes length within the limit.
• git status shows launch.json as the only new or changed file.

The review is complete and found no defects. The findings file is written with an empty list and a full coverage record, and the repository tree is unchanged apart from that file.

What was reviewed. The Runner token is a 17-line contract that inherits OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 unchanged and mints 1e27 base units to msg.sender in its constructor. I applied the Senior Auditor's Mindset and then the Execution Trace, Periphery and First Principles guides to the three entry points and their inherited paths, with the x-ray deployment profile and the Trail of Bits entry-point inventory as background.

What held, with evidence:

• Execution trace. transfer and transferFrom were traced through _transfer, _update and _spendAllowance in the vendored base. No external calls sit between any read and write, so stale reads are impossible. Allowance is spent before the balance moves, in one atomic transaction, so a failing transfer restores the allowance. A zero-address source cannot mint: nonzero value hits an insufficient allowance revert and zero value hits the invalid sender revert. Self-transfers and self-transferFrom net to zero. These were confirmed with scratch tests that all passed.
• Periphery. All five vendored OpenZeppelin files were diffed against upstream tag v5.4.0 and are byte-identical. Context returns plain msg.sender, so there is no meta-transaction trust path. The artifact has no unlinked library references.
• First principles. The supply constant equals the README and manifest figure of 1e27. A CREATE2 factory probe confirmed the factory, not the end user, holds the whole supply and the constructor takes no arguments. The ABI exposes no mint, burn, owner, pause, blacklist, initialize or upgrade selector, and there is no receive or fallback, so ETH and unknown calls revert. A runtime opcode walk matching the protected floor's rule found no reachable DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT, CALL, STATICCALL or CREATE.

Tool leads. Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's large-numeric-literal line at src/Runner.sol:12 is style only. The literal evaluates to the correct supply, which the project's tests check against an independently written constant.

Checks run. The project's own suite passed with the README seed, with 30 unit and fuzz tests and both stateful invariants over 8,192 handler calls, and forge fmt --check was clean.

Not reported. The standard ERC-20 approve front-running property applies, as with every unmodified ERC-20. The README documents it for holders and it is not a defect in the requested design. No launch.json exists yet, so there was no manifest to check against the constructor.

The review is complete. The findings file holds an empty list and seven coverage rows, and the working tree is clean apart from that file.

Scope

Files read: src/Runner.sol (17 lines), the vendored OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20.sol and Context.sol it inherits, both project test files, the README, and the protected launch floor test. Guides applied: Math Precision, Boundary, Numerical Gap, plus the Senior Auditor's Mindset.

Severity counts: 0 Critical · 0 High · 0 Medium · 0 Low

Result: no defects in the assigned area

The token adds no arithmetic of its own. Its entire math surface is one compile-time constant and the unmodified OpenZeppelin _update and _spendAllowance paths. I checked each failure mode the three guides list against that surface:

• Supply constant. The literal at line 12 evaluates to exactly 10^27, confirmed by test against the spelled-out integer. The aderyn "large numeric literal" lead is a style note with no numerical effect.
• Overflow and unchecked blocks. The sender's balance is checked before the unchecked subtraction. The receiver's unchecked addition cannot wrap because the sum of all balances equals the single-mint supply. Transfers of max uint256 and of supply plus one revert with the exact ERC-6093 error and arguments.
• Allowance sentinel edges. An allowance of max uint256 is never decremented. Max minus one decrements normally to max minus two. Spending more than the allowance reverts before any state write, and a transfer that fails after the allowance check rolls the allowance back atomically.
• Zero and boundary inputs. Zero transfers and self transfers succeed and conserve supply. Transfer to the zero address reverts even for zero amount. Zero-amount transferFrom with no allowance succeeds, which is standard ERC-20 behaviour.
• Decimal mixing. No decimals override and no hardcoded scale. The launch splits of ten, eighty and ten percent of 10^27 are exact integers, so no rounding loss reaches the swarm share, seed or remainder.
• Numerical gap seams. With no fee, cap, or derived quantity, there is no seam between precision, boundary and invariant to exploit. Conservation held across the project's stateful invariant run and a fuzz test I wrote and then removed.

The full project suite passed, and my temporary scratch tests passed before deletion.

Suite	Result
Project unit and fuzz tests	30 passed
Project stateful invariants	2 passed, 8192 calls, 0 reverts
Scratch boundary tests (removed)	8 passed

Observations (non-blocking)

The opening price derivation from the 5000 IMD cap over 10^27 tokens belongs to the deployer, not the token. The resulting tick is roughly -122,000, well inside Uniswap v4's range, so the seed is not at risk from the token's side.

The review is complete. No defects were found in the Access Control, Trust Gap or Asymmetry areas, and the result is recorded in .imd-findings.json with an empty findings list and seven coverage rows.

What was checked

• Access control. The contract has no roles. The constructor takes no arguments and only mints to the caller. The compiled ABI exposes exactly three state-changing selectors, approve, transfer and transferFrom, plus views. There is no owner, mint, pause, blacklist, burn, upgrade or initializer entry point for anyone to abuse, so none of the protected floor's privileged-call probes can be triggered.
• Trust gap. The only trust claim is that the base contract is unmodified OpenZeppelin v5.4.0. I compared the five vendored files byte for byte against the upstream tag on GitHub, and all are identical. The runtime bytecode contains no CALL, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT or CREATE opcodes.
• Asymmetry. transfer and transferFrom both route through the same internal update, so every balance write is mirrored. transferFrom additionally decrements a finite allowance before the balance change and leaves an unlimited allowance untouched, which the README documents. Zero-address sender, receiver and spender all revert on both sides.
• Supply. The constant equals 10^27, the README's stated base units, and the constructor is its only writer.

Verification run

Check	Result
forge build	success
Project unit and invariant tests	31 passed, 0 failed
Vendored OZ files vs upstream v5.4.0	5 of 5 identical
Static-analysis leads	aderyn large-literal is style only, not a defect

Coverage record. All three listed entry points are marked holds, with four extra rows for the invariants checked: no privileged role, fixed supply minted once, authentic vendored base, and no forbidden opcodes. No files in the repository were modified. The scratch test directory was not used because there was no finding to prove.

The review is complete and the findings file is written. No defects were found in the assigned area.

What was reviewed

The Runner token is a 17-line contract that inherits OpenZeppelin v5.4.0 ERC20 with no overrides and mints 10^27 units to the deployer in its constructor. I confirmed the vendored OpenZeppelin files are byte-identical to the upstream v5.4.0 archive, whose hash matches the one in the provenance record. The compiled ABI contains only the standard ERC-20 functions plus the supply constant. The project's own 31 tests and both stateful invariants pass with the pinned seed.

Checks from the three guides

• Economic Security. No external dependencies, oracles, fees or callbacks exist, so there is nothing to break or sandwich. Transfers deliver the exact amount, which is what the launch floor requires of the factory, PoolManager and distributor flows. Zero-address and zero-amount sentinels revert or no-op exactly as ERC-20 specifies.
• Invariant. Supply conservation holds because no mint or burn path is reachable after the constructor. Allowance coupling is exact: finite allowances fall by the spent amount, max allowance is sticky, and a reverted spend restores the allowance atomically.
• Flow Gap. A scratch Foundry probe exercised the 10/80/10 split, per-claimant drains of the distributor, pool-style pay-outs and allowance pulls, and the factory's lack of power after forwarding. All amounts arrived whole with no dust attributable to the token. The derived opening price from the stated market cap sits inside Uniswap v4's sqrt price bounds in either currency order.

Static analysis leads. Slither reported nothing. Aderyn's low-severity large-literal note points at the intended supply constant and is not a defect.

Not reached. No launch manifest exists in the tree, so manifest fields could not be checked. The protected PoolManager harness depends on v4-core, which is not vendored here, so the seed and swap were exercised through stub transfers rather than a real pool.

Output. The findings file holds an empty findings list and eight coverage rows, one for each of the three entry points plus the constructor and four economic invariants, all marked as holding. The scratch test directory was removed and no repository file was changed.

The review is complete and the tree is clean apart from the findings file. Review result: no defects, and all three entry points hold.

What I checked

• Source. The token at src/Runner.sol is a 17-line contract inheriting OpenZeppelin ERC20 with no overrides. Its constructor mints the constant supply to msg.sender and nothing else exists.
• Vendored dependency. I fetched the five OpenZeppelin files from the upstream v5.4.0 tag and compared them byte for byte. All five are identical to the copies in lib.
• Compiled ABI. The only mutators are approve, transfer and transferFrom, plus a parameterless nonpayable constructor. There is no mint, burn, owner, initializer, receive or fallback.
• Floor reproduction. A scratch test deployed the token through CREATE2 from a factory-like probe. The probe received the whole supply of 10^27 units, decimals returned 18, the ten percent flow to a distributor and on to a claimant arrived whole, a transferFrom by the deployer with no allowance failed and moved nothing, ETH was rejected, and the reachable-opcode scan found no DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE or SELFDESTRUCT.
• Size. Creation code is 2,638 bytes and runtime 1,753 bytes, far below the deployment limits.
• Manifest. launch.json uses only schema keys, an empty constructorArgs list matching the argument-less constructor, a totalSupply equal to what the constructor mints, lowercase addresses, numeric fee, tick spacing and decimals, and notes under the length limit.
• Project tests. All 48 of the author's unit, fuzz and invariant tests pass with the README's seed.

Specialist findings. All four specialists and the independent tester reported nothing, so there was nothing to reproduce or merge. The one static-analysis lead, aderyn's large-numeric-literal note, is a style remark about a constant that evaluates exactly to the manifest supply, and is not a defect.

Output. The findings file at the repository root holds an empty findings list and eight coverage rows: the three entry points plus five invariant rows, each marked holds with its reason. The scratch test directory was removed, so no repository file was changed.