Wrote {"findings":[]} to .imd-findings.json.

No substantiated defects found after reviewing requirements, contracts, tests, and ABIs. launch.json was absent, so manifest review remains outstanding. Tests were inspected, not rerun. Implementation and configuration were unchanged.

launch.json is written and verified. Summary:

Manifest

Checks run

• Schema + refinements — validated every constraint in the canonical LaunchManifest schema programmatically: additionalProperties:false on all four objects, identifier pattern/length, MerkleDistributor not used, uniqueness across token and contract names, initialPrice pattern and < 2^256, contracts 1–8, args ≤16 and ≤96 chars, and the backward-reference rule. Passed.
• Against the compiled artifacts, not the source text — read out/*/*.json ABIs: token constructor has zero inputs; CommitRevealVote has exactly one input, address token_, nonpayable, matching the single $token arg one-for-one. Reference-in-address-typed-argument rule confirmed against the actual ABI type. Token's function list is allowance/approve/balanceOf/decimals/name/symbol/totalSupply/transfer/transferFrom — no mint or admin path.
• Protected suites rehearsed in test/scratch/ — drove Token.protected.t.sol and Project.protected.t.sol with env derived from the manifest's own numbers (IMD_TOKEN_DECIMALS=18, IMD_EXPECTED_SUPPLY=1e27, IMD_PROJECT_COUNT=1, project-0 init code = CommitRevealVote creation code ++ abi-encoded CREATE2 token address, i.e. $token resolved). 8/8 pass, including the decimals-vs-manifest cross-check and the constructor/supply/opcode floor.
• Tree — forge build, forge test (12 passed), forge fmt --check all clean. git status outside scratch shows only ?? launch.json.

Two things worth flagging, neither in my write scope

1. CommitRevealVote has no owner, admin or fee role at all, so there is no constructor parameter for $owner to fill. That is why no $owner appears — it reflects the source, not an omission. Ownership rests with policy alone and no wallet is named anywhere in the manifest.
2. The accepted tests deliberately declare their own minimal Vm interface rather than importing forge-std, and there is no lib/. That is self-consistent and passes offline, but the protected suites do import forge-std/Test.sol, so the verifier must supply it. I vendored forge-std into test/scratch/lib/ for the rehearsal only, via a CLI --remappings override; nothing in the delivered tree depends on it and remappings.txt/lib//foundry.toml were untouched.

Review complete. No repository files were modified; findings are in .imd-findings.json.

What I verified first

Built src/ unmodified with solc 0.8.26 in a scratch tree (so no build artifacts land in the repo) and ran the delivered suite: 12/12 pass. Committed ABIs in docs/abi/ are byte-for-byte equal to forge inspect <C> abi for both contracts. launch.json validates against the LaunchManifest schema — kind, token block matching the source constants, policy pool params, one contract CommitRevealVote with ["$token"] filling its single address token_ parameter, notes 3811/4000 chars, no hard-coded wallet, no $owner (correctly, since the contract has no privileged role at all).

I also checked and found sound: the fixed-supply/no-mint profile against the protected token floor; the unchecked balance credit in _transfer (safe under the fixed-supply invariant); struct packing vs. the public getter tuple order that the tests destructure; every phase boundary ([0,commitDeadline), [commitDeadline,revealDeadline), [revealDeadline,∞) — no overlap, no gap); CEI ordering and the shared mutex, including whether revealVote being unguarded opens cross-function reentrancy (it does not — in both callback positions the reveal window is provably closed); and that no path lets a voter reclaim more than they locked or spend weight twice.

Findings

1 — high. The commitment is not domain-separated. keccak256(abi.encode(choice, salt)) binds neither msg.sender nor proposalId, and commitVote only rejects a repeat from the same address. Bob copies Alice's and Carol's public commitments from two funded addresses, learns both preimages at reveal time, and reveals only the mirror that suits him — 1000e18 of weight chosen after all information is public, fully refunded, flipping a verified 600 FOR / 500 AGAINST into 600 / 1500. Caveat stated in the finding: workflow.md literally specifies keccak256(choice, salt) and README.md documents that preimage for the frontend, so the standard fix (adding proposalId, msg.sender) is a scope decision for the brief owner and also touches web/.

2 — medium. revealDeadline is unbounded. openProposal(h, ts+60, type(uint64).max) is accepted; commits are irrevocable, reclaim reverts TooEarlyToReclaim for ~584 billion years, and there is no owner or rescue path.

3 — medium. No minimum phase length. revealDeadline == commitDeadline + 1 makes the reveal window exactly one second wide; on Sepolia's 12s slot grid a non-aligned deadline leaves zero mineable blocks inside it, so every ballot is unrevealable and the tally is permanently 0/0 while QRM stays locked. The mirror case (commitDeadline == block.timestamp + 1) makes a proposal unvotable from the next block.

4 — low. Token test coverage. Confirmed by mutation, not assertion: deleting the zero-recipient require, or forcing infinite allowances to decrement, both leave the delivered suite at 12/12 green. testInsufficientBalanceOrAllowanceRevertsWithoutBallot also never reaches the balance underflow — its actor has zero allowance, so it panics on the allowance subtraction first.

Each finding's reproduction field carries the exact test body I ran; all four reproduce against the accepted source as committed.

Fixed all four reproduced findings:

• Bound commitments to proposal ID and voter.
• Required one-hour phases and capped lock duration at 90 days.
• Added token failure and regression tests.
• Updated ABI, README, and .imd-responses.json.

Offline build, all 17 tests, and formatting checks pass. Solidity remains pinned to version 0.8.26, not a path.

Findings written to .imd-findings.json. No tracked file was modified.

What I checked

Built and ran the delivered suite (17 passed), diffed docs/abi/*.json against forge inspect <C> abi (byte-identical for both contracts), and re-ran the protected floor's own criteria locally: runtime 1,269 / 2,845 bytes, no DELEGATECALL/CALLCODE/SELFDESTRUCT after stepping over PUSH immediates, Quorum zero-arg constructor minting exactly 1e27 to msg.sender, no mint/admin path, CommitRevealVote's constructor touching no balances. Then I attacked the protocol logic in a scratch copy with fuzzed conservation tests and a mutation battery.

No critical or high finding. The custody accounting is sound: I fuzzed commit→reveal→reclaim over 256 runs and forVotes + againstVotes always equalled the locked total, the contract balance always returned to zero, and cross-proposal reclaims never touched another proposal's funds. Commit/reveal/reclaim boundaries are exclusive-inclusive with no overlapping window, the commitment is domain-bound to (proposalId, voter) so ballots can't be copied or replayed, reentrancy into both custody calls reverts, and there is no owner, fee, upgrade or admin path in either contract. Those all hold.

What I found

1. medium — The commitment preimage is keccak256(abi.encode(proposalId, msg.sender, choice, salt)), but workflow.md specifies keccak256(choice, salt). Any client built to the approved brief commits successfully, locks its QRM, and then gets InvalidReveal() forever. The deviation is the better design and README.md documents it — the fix is amending the brief and handing the preimage to the web assignment, not weakening the contract.
2. medium — Not one test asserts an event, against an explicit "events for every state change" requirement. I deleted all four emits from CommitRevealVote, then inverted VoteRevealed's choice and zeroed its weight, then removed Quorum's mint Transfer: 17/17 passed each time. The website reads tallies from these logs.
3. low — CEI ordering is untested in both custody functions. Inverting it in commitVote and reclaim (the classic double-withdraw shape) still passes 17/17, because MaliciousTokenTest only ever asserts the guard fires. The shipped code has the right order — this is the test being weaker than the README claims.
4. low — Every proposals() read in the suite discards the first three fields. Storing bytes32(0) as the title hash of every proposal passes 17/17.
5. info — Revealing is a free option: running totals are public during the reveal window and non-revealers get a 100% refund, so the largest committer decides last at zero cost. Consistent with the brief; recorded as an economics assumption, since any fix changes agreed behaviour.

No launch.json exists yet, which is expected — the manifest assignment hasn't run, and an early review doesn't require it.

launch.json is the only changed file. The manifest body (kind, token, pool, contracts) was already correct and I left it untouched — the source revision that landed after my last round (4193ab7) changed openProposal deadline bounds and the commitment preimage, but not either constructor, so CommitRevealVote(address token_) <- ["$token"] still matches the accepted implementation exactly.

No findings text arrived with this revision, so I re-verified the manifest against the canonical schema and the compiled ABIs myself and corrected three notes statements that the source revision had made imprecise or incomplete:

• "the only balance-changing functions are transfer/transferFrom/approve" → approve only touches allowances.
• Added that MIN_PHASE_DURATION (1 hours) and MAX_PROPOSAL_DURATION (90 days) are compile-time constants, not deployment parameters — so the "no initialization calls" claim now covers every configuration knob a reviewer would look for.
• "holds only the QRM that voters lock" → the contract declares no receive/fallback (cannot hold ETH), and directly transferred QRM is not attributed to a ballot.

Those additions pushed notes to 4245 characters, over the 4000 cap; my validator caught it and I trimmed redundant prose back to 3954.

Verification, all from the repo root:

• Schema check (written against the canonical LaunchManifest schema plus its refinements — unique names, MerkleDistributor reserved, backward-only $contract refs, references in address-typed args only, initialPrice < 2^256, notes ≤ 4000): VALID.
• Cross-check against docs/abi/: token constructor has zero inputs; CommitRevealVote constructor is nonpayable, arity 1, and its single input is address, which is what $token requires.
• forge build --force exit 0, forge test 17 passed / 0 failed, forge fmt --check exit 0.
• git status --porcelain shows only M launch.json.

All four prior findings are settled. I re-ran each original reproduction against the current source in a scratch copy (repo untouched, git status clean, sources byte-identical to the baseline I mutated).

Prior findings — resolution

Also checked this round: ABI exports in docs/abi/ match the 0.8.26 build exactly for both contracts; both runtimes are well under EIP-170 with no DELEGATECALL/CALLCODE/SELFDESTRUCT; launch.json is schema-valid (notes 3954/4000, unique non-reserved name, single address-typed $token backward reference, no hard-coded wallet, standard pool params) and its claims about the source — constructor shape, InvalidToken() guard, the 1h/90d constants, no privileged role, no receive/fallback — are all accurate. State-transition coverage is genuinely solid: mutating the tally direction, the commit boundary >=, the reclaim boundary, and the AlreadyCommitted guard each fails the suite.

Reported in .imd-findings.json (2, neither blocking the implementation):

1. low — no test asserts any event. The hand-rolled Vm interface (test/CommitRevealVote.t.sol:7) has no expectEmit/recordLogs, and nothing checks logs. Four event mutations — including deleting ProposalOpened outright — each leave the suite at 17/17 passing. The brief requires events for every state change and the website must read them.
2. info — the commitment preimage now deviates from the brief's literal keccak256(choice, salt). Correct and documented at README.md:10, no web/ in this tree; flagged so the frontend assignment uses the README formula. A brief-literal client's commit is accepted and then permanently unrevealable (InvalidReveal(), stake locked until revealDeadline, zero weight counted).

Implemented source, lockfile, static export and validation evidence.

• Build, typecheck and all 9 browser tests pass.
• Deployment fields, ABI hashes and all 74 asset hashes verify.
• Export: 2.4 MB; scratch Git bundle: 1.39 MB.
• No real transactions broadcast.

See validation evidence.

Commit remains blocked by the checkout’s read-only .git; files are ready for the publisher’s commit.